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Foreword

“Municipal governments can be
neither free nor responsible unless
they are guaranteed the right (and
the compulsion) to decide purely local
matters for themselves.”
– Carl Chatters, Executive Director of the

American Municipal Association (AMA) (1953)

When Carl Chatters, wrote those words more than six decades ago in the
AMA’s influential “Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home
Rule,” he referred to the strong emotions that local leaders have toward
the concept of home rule. That deep desire for local decision-making is
the common thread that continues to link municipal officials across time,
geography, and political ideology.
The model constitutional provisions from the AMA, which became the
National League of Cities in 1964, were a significant advancement for their
time, proposing changes to home rule that sought to disentangle earlier
approaches from fruitless litigation over the scope of local government
authority. The AMA Model made clear that cities have broad authority
to govern and are subject to equally broad state oversight. Almost every
state that modified their home rule provisions in the decades after the
publication of the AMA Model followed its basic approach.
Given how much has changed for cities, towns and villages in the intervening
67 years, it is imperative that we revisit the fundamental legal structure
of state-local relations for the 21st Century. Since the wave of home rule
reform that followed the publication of the AMA Model, our nation has
experienced significant changes driven by shifts in the urban landscape.
Cities and their metropolitan regions are at the epicenter of America’s
place in the global economy – and local governments are responding to
our nation’s deepest and most pressing policy concerns. At the same time,
4
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unfortunately, as NLC has documented, states are increasingly interfering
with the ability of cities and other local governments to act on the vision
and values of their communities.
At this critical juncture, the need to empower cities, towns and villages is
clear: constituents are demanding pragmatic local problem solving and
they understand the benefits of their communities being true subsidiaries
of the federal system – experimentation, policy responsiveness, political
accountability, and genuine diversity.
Local democracy has always been important, but the ability of local
governments to meet the needs of their communities in today’s climate
is insufficient. Cities remain far too limited in what they can do to respond
to local policy demands – from structuring their democratic processes to
securing critically needed revenue to responding to a range of regulatory
issues. The time for a new, vigorous vision of home rule has arrived.
This publication, “Principles of Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century,”
represents the culmination of a year-long process of research, drafting,
outreach, and refinement. The principles are a hopeful vision for the future
of state-local relations, grounded in the lessons of more than 130 years of
experience with home rule. They make clear that cities, towns and villages
are fully capable of governing, and that states must have a healthy respect
for the institutions of local democracy.
These principles, with their accompanying model provisions and
commentary, will spark a new approach to local authority, fostering longoverdue law reform and guiding the vital work of city and state officials
as well as stakeholders and advocates. Local democracy needs a reset for
the 21st Century. This document is a leap forward towards achieving it.

Clarence E. Anthony
CEO and Executive Director
National League of Cities
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3539617

5

Part I:
Preamble
1.

Introduction 					7

2.

The Many Paths of Home Rule 			

9

3.

The Imperative to Reform Home Rule		

13

4.

A Road Map to the Principles for Home Rule

19

5.

Conclusion						20

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3539617

Introduction
In our trilevel federal system, local governments perform a wide
array of crucial governance roles. They are frontline providers of
some of the most important services the public relies on every day
and increasingly confront the most vexing policy challenges facing
our nation. Municipal home rule provides the foundational legal
authority for these indispensable responsibilities, reflecting the
vitality of local democracy.
Because the federal Constitution is silent about local governments, home
rule is defined by state law.1 Nearly all states have some form of home rule—
constitutionally grounded in many states, statutory in others, and often
a combination of the two—and courts have always played a central role
in explicating the boundaries of state-and-local relations. Unsurprisingly,
there is significant variation across and even within states, and the nature
of home rule has changed over time as our ever-contested understanding
of the proper balance between the state and the local has developed.
In 1953, the American Municipal Association (AMA)—which became the
National League of Cities (NLC) in 1964—published the last comprehensive
proposed reform of home rule, sparking a wave of constitutional change
in the years that followed. As Clarence Anthony notes in his Foreword,
however, much has changed about the state-local relationship in the
intervening six and a half decades. With cities now at the forefront of
governance in our interconnected, global economy, and states seeking
to constrain local authority with growing vehemence, the time is ripe to
examine home rule anew.
To undertake that task, NLC and the Local Solutions Support Center
(LSSC)—an organization created to foster collaboration among those
working in support of local democracy—convened a group of stateand-local-government legal scholars in the fall of 2018 to begin a
comprehensive examination of home rule. The scholars brought together
by NLC and LSSC surveyed historical models and plumbed lessons from
how home rule has been enacted as well as understood in practice across
the country. From that review, the working group crafted a proposal that
they refined with the help of local officials, state municipal league leaders,
city attorneys engaged with state-local dynamics, advocates, and other
stakeholders over the past year.”
Emerging from that examination is a holistic set of general principles to
guide the complex legal issues that define the nature of local autonomy
1
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does acknowledge an internal division of
authority below the level of the federal government in its pronouncement that powers “not delegated
to the United States,” unless otherwise prohibited by the Constitution, are “reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” See Jake Sullivan, The Tenth Amendment and Local Government, 112
Yale L.J. 1935, 1937 (2003). That disjunctive phrasing, rarely noted by the Supreme Court, clearly
implies that the federal Constitution recognizes that state sovereignty and popular sovereignty
are not identical, leaving federal constitutional space for the people of each state to delegate their
popular sovereignty within their states between state and local-government levels.
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in the modern context. As explained below, these principles are organized
around four interrelated propositions: local governments should have
the breadth of legal authority necessary to govern; ensuring local fiscal
authority is critical to that governance role; states should exercise their
authority over local autonomy—a necessary, and at times crucial, power
that all states have—with due respect for the local communities whose
democratic choices they are displacing; and protecting the choices that
communities make about the process of local democracy is at the core of
local autonomy.
These principles, detailed in the section that follows this preamble, are
not meant to be an abstract guide to local authority and the state-local
relationship, although at a minimum they give content to the contemporary
meaning of home rule. Rather, the principles are meant to foster a serious
conversation about the state-local relationship in order to achieve
meaningful legal reform. This publication accordingly also provides, in a
third section, a model home rule constitutional article with provisions that
correspond to the principles, although sequenced in an order to function
as legal text. The model home rule article is accompanied by commentary
on the legal foundations and innovations underlying the article’s terms,
both to guide constitutional change in the states, as the 1953 AMA Model
Constitutional Provisions sparked, and to foster judicial understanding as
courts consider existing home rule provisions and future reforms.
This preamble provides background and context to understand the
principles, model constitutional text, and commentary that follow,
situating the new vision for home rule in the sweep of past approaches.
It then explains why there is a compelling imperative for reform now,
both to recognize the growing importance of local governance and to
protect against the rise of state interference that fails to appreciate the
positive role of local governments in our state-local system. The preamble
concludes with a road map for how officials, advocates, and the people of
the states can use this work to advance local democracy and recognize
local community.

8
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The Many Paths of Home Rule
In simple terms, home rule seeks to align the legal status of local
governments with the foundational role they play in our system
of governance.
It is often—too often—said that cities and counties are creatures of state
law, even in states with the strongest existing versions of constitutional
home rule. That proposition is technically true, but state governments are
also creatures of state law and the truism does not reveal anything definitive
about how any given state allocates formal legal authority between the state
and the local level. That is a question that state, and federal, constitutional
law leaves entirely to the people of each state to determine.
To understand, then, what home rule can mean in our current moment, it
would be useful first to glance back briefly at the historical development of
the concept, and the many divergent paths that home rule has taken in the
states.
The inherent right to local self-government was an animating motivation
for the American Revolution. 2 Alexis de Tocqueville noted in Democracy
in America that what he described as “municipal liberty” was the “natural
consequence” of this Founding-era principle of “the sovereignty of the
people.”3 Indeed, although there was much variation among the colonies
and their local governments, there is evidence that local governments in
New England were understood to have constituted the states—not the other
way around.4
However, because federal constitutional silence left the balance between state
and local legal authority to be determined within the states, states throughout
the nineteenth century sought to assert control over local governance. The
legal structure of local autonomy during much of the nineteenth century
thus moved toward a predominant, if not uniform, understanding of local
governments as formally legally subordinate to the states.5 In its strongest
form, this subordinated instrumentality view is often referred to as Dillon’s or
Dillon Rule, after John F. Dillon, who served as an Iowa Supreme Court justice
and as a United States circuit judge. In an influential treatise on municipal
corporations published shortly after the Civil War and in his jurisprudence,
Judge Dillon argued that local governments, as administrative conveniences

2

Dale Krane, et al., Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook 8 (2001).

3

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 67 (1835).

4

See Amasa M. Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 447 (1900).

A line of nineteenth-century cases alludes to or relies on an inherent right of local self-government
independent of state law. See id. at 441, 446–47 (collecting cases, including Judge Cooley’s famous
concurrence in People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 107 (1871) (Cooley, J., concurring)); see
also Howard Lee McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 Colum. L. Rev.
190 (1916) (tracing examples of cases invoking the right to local self-government, and arguing that the
handful of cases decided on this basis were outliers in the jurisprudence); James E. Herget, The Missing
Power of Local Governments: A Divergence between Text and Practice in Our Early State Constitutions,
62 Va. L. Rev. 999, 1004–06 (1976) (discussing early American jurisprudence); see generally David J.
Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 487, 509–22
(1999).
5
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of the state, had no inherent lawmaking authority, possessing only those
powers expressly delegated to them by the state or indispensable to the
purposes of their incorporation.6
Even in this pre–home rule era, state supremacy was hardly plenary, and
legal protection for local democracy found expression in a variety of
nineteenth-century state constitutional constraints. For example, advocates
of local autonomy moved many states to amend their constitutions to
bar or impose procedural constraints on “special” legislation, with some
states giving cities power to exempt themselves from special acts.7 Similar
movements focused on limiting classes of local governments, or established
threshold numbers for local government units within any given class.8 And
advocates also targeted so-called “ripper” legislation through which states
displaced specific local institutions and responsibilities, or even removed
local officials from office.9
After the Civil War, rapid urbanization and growing populations in cities
across the country led to movements to vindicate local authority, with
reform efforts shifting from incremental constraints on the worst state
abuses to a broader engagement with local power. In 1875, these efforts
began to bear fruit, ushering in an era challenging the concept of formal
legal powerlessness. That year, Missouri became the first state to enshrine
home rule in its constitution, leading to a wave of Progressive Era reforms
that empowered growing cities across the country to govern.10
The basic theory of this first wave of home rule was that state constitutions
would empower cities to adopt charters and that cities that did so—St.
Louis being the first—would be given the power to act with respect to what
were considered “local” or “municipal” affairs. This is what scholars often
refer to as the “initiative” or “initiation” authority.11 But this early approach
to home rule also sought corresponding constitutional protection for
local governments against state interference in this local realm—the so-

City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad, 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868) (“Municipal
corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It
breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy.
If it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right,
the legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great
a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation
could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on this right so far as the corporations themselves
are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.”); 1 John F. Dillon,
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 9b (2d ed. 1873). Dillon’s Rule is also a rule of construction,
holding that any delegated authority should be construed narrowly against local authority. Id. at §
55. The concept of the legal subordination of local governments to state law has been most clearly
recognized in federal law in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, a Contracts Clause and due process case in
which the Supreme Court stated that “[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may
be entrusted to them,” as a result of which, the Court concluded, the state “at its pleasure may modify
or withdraw all such powers … expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it
with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation.” 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).

6

U.S. Advisory Comm. on Intergovernmental Relations, Measuring Local Discretionary Authority 5
(1981).

7

8

Id.

See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of
Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 775,
805-06 (1992); Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership and Local
Autonomy, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1109, 1126–27 (2012).
9

10
11

10

David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2296-2321 (2003).
See Gordon L. Clark, Judges and the Cities: Interpreting Local Autonomy 7 (1985).
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called “immunity” function of home rule.12 For this reason, the model has
been described as “imperio” home rule, after the Latin phrase imperium i
imperio—a government within a government.13
This approach spread over the course of several decades, with twelve states
enacting home rule between 1875 and 1912.14 Although imperio home rule
marked an important constitutional milestone, courts encountered some
difficulty in defining the realm of the local. Some case law read the scope
of local authority narrowly, and some judges evinced resistance to honoring
the immunity function of the local or municipal realm, finding even some
admittedly local or municipal matters subject to state override if a given
policy area involved both state and local interests.
In 1953, as noted, the American Municipal Association sparked a second
wave of home-rule reform, with a fundamentally different approach
to local legal autonomy in the Model Constitutional Provisions.15 The
principal drafter of the AMA Model, then–University of Pennsylvania Law
School Dean Jefferson B. Fordham, began with the proposition that state
constitutions should delegate (or direct state legislatures to so delegate)
to general-purpose local governments the full range of state legislative
authority. However, that initiative power was to be accompanied by broad
state authority to structure or preempt local law, at least if done so by laws
that were general in their terms and effects.16 For this reason, the AMA
Model is often referred to (somewhat confusingly) as “legislative” home
rule—legislative not in the sense that the source of authority is statutory (it
is usually constitutional), but in the sense that the state legislature retains
nearly plenary power to modify home rule, subject to other constitutional
constraints such as generality mandates, bans on special legislation, and
procedural requirements.17
The AMA Model proved quite influential, with all states amending their
constitutions’ local government articles or adopting new constitutions
after 1953 (with the exception of Oregon’s county home rule amendmen
1958) following a version of the AMA Model.18 In practice, the AMA Model
12

Id.

Lynn Baker and Daniel Rodriguez have captured the deep constitutional significance of this
inversion of the creature-of-the-state conception of local governments:

13

[I]mperio home rule was even more remarkable than constitutional federalism. After all, the latter
was built upon the circumstances of the states existing as independent sovereigns that joined
together to form the nation, the United States. Constitutional localism, in contrast, was built upon
a notion that whatever municipalities the state chose to create should, after creation, be accorded
a realm of autonomy from ex post control by their creator. As a matter of theory, constitutional
home rule represents an unusual and truly radical reconstitution of the traditional model of state/
local relations and of the role of the courts in a constitutional system.
Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 Denv. L. Rev.
1337, 1342 (2009). See St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893) (describing St.
Louis as an “imperium in imperio” in Missouri’s home rule system).
14
These states were Missouri (1875), California (1879), Washington (1889), Minnesota (1896), Colorado
(1902), Oregon (1906), Oklahoma (1908), Michigan (1908), Arizona (1912), Ohio (1912), Nebraska
(1912), and Texas (1912). See Howard Lee McBain, The Law and the Practice of Municipal Home Rule
114-17 (1916).
15

See Barron, supra note 10, at 2325-29.

16

Am. Mun. Ass’n, Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule 6 (1953)

Some states require that the state legislature preempt local authority expressly. See City of New
Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 640 So. 2d 237, 243 (La. 1994).

17

18

U.S. Advisory Comm., supra note 7, at 6. In 1968, another civic organization, then called the National
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largely accomplished the drafters’ primary goal of shifting the presumption
of home rule toward broader local initiative power; although states were
not entirely consistent in providing the full breadth of that local authority, at
times reserving specific powers to the state level.19 And while state discretion
to shape local authority proved mostly workable over the course of the next
several decades, the underlying bargain at the heart of the model, as discussed
below, is under increasing strain as states are taking more aggressive steps
to override local policies.
This long historical development has left quite a varied landscape of home
rule. States have adapted and modified the two main historical models, at
times blending aspects of each, and often applying approaches differently
across types or categories of local governments. Whatever the baseline
constitutional authorization, moreover, legislation in every state regularly
modifies the scope of local authority. And courts have always played a central
role in interpreting what are often open-ended constitutional and statutory
provisions framing home rule.
Today, a few states—Alabama, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Nevada, North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia—have constitutions that do
not directly delegate (or direct their legislatures to delegate) police power
to local governments, leaving the scope of local authority to their state
legislatures.20 All others enshrine home rule in their constitutions in some
fashion.21 Any simple taxonomy is surprisingly difficult to construct given
the variation within many states and the often-muddled judicial gloss on
constitutional provisions, but home rule states seem roughly split between
those that primarily follow imperio home rule and those that primarily follow
some version of the AMA Model.22
Ultimately, as Judge David Barron has astutely noted, constant contestation
over the purposes of home rule and the nature of the local role has generated
targeted state interventions alternating between particular grants of, and
limitations on, local authority. These legal structures have been designed
not to vindicate some general theory of the allocation of power between
states and local governments, but generally to advance specific policy or
governance goals.23 Home rule has never existed in a vacuum, making the
need for first principles that much more compelling.
Municipal League (NML), today known as the National Civic League, promulgated its own model
home rule constitutional provision that largely embraced the AMA approach, but offered the explicit
limitation that state legislatures could preempt local authority only by general law. Nat’l Mun. League,
Model Constitution § 8.02 (1968). See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1125 n. 59
(2007).
19

See U.S. Advisory Committee, supra note 7, at 6.

See generally Ala. Const. art IV, §89; Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, § 802 (2019); Ind. Const. art. IV, § 23; Ky.
Const. § 156b; Miss. Code Ann. §§ 21-17-1(1), 21-17-5 (2019); Nev. Const. art. VIII, § 8 (2019); N.C. Const.
art. VII, § 1; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2645 (2019); Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1102 (2019).

20

21
Most state constitutional home rule provisions address cities and counties, although the scope of
local authority and autonomy often varies between these forms of local government. The constitutions
of Georgia and Arkansas, however, establish home rule for counties, but not for municipalities. See
generally Ga. Const. art. IX, §§ II, para. I – para. II; Ark. Code Ann. § 14-42-307 (2019); Ark. Const. art. 12,
§ 3; Ark. Const. amend. 55, § 4. Hawaii takes the same approach as a functional matter, in that other
than the combined city/county of Honolulu, the state formally recognizes only county-level political
subdivisions of general jurisdiction. See Haw. Const. art. VIII, § 1.
22
See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 13, at 1338–39 (cataloguing 21 legislative home rule states and
25 imperio home rule states); Diller, supra note 18, at 1126–27 (citing authority that tallies 26 legislative
states and 19 imperio states).
23

12

See Barron, supra note 10, at 2296–2328.
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The Imperative to Reform Home Rule
Why is it necessary to revisit home rule now? There are strong
reasons that grow from the evolving role of the local in our national
system of governance—in terms of the role of cities and other
local governments in the global economy; the leading role that
local governments now play in policy innovation; and increasing
diversity at the local level. There is also an imperative for reform
grounded in the increasing sense that state oversight is no longer
serving the constructive, collaborative role in the state-local legal
relationship that it should.

To begin, in the more than sixty-five years since the American Municipal
Association published its Model Constitutional Provisions in 1953, the
foundation of the nation’s economic strength has become undeniably and
increasingly urban in an increasingly global economy. In 2017, for example,
the nation’s ten highest-producing metro economies combined generated a
record $6.8 trillion in economic value in 2017—more than the collective output
of 37 states.24 Metro economies were responsible for almost all of the growth
(99.5 percent) in real GDP in 2017.25 Their combined output exceeded all the
nations of the world except China (and, of course, the United States itself).26
Metropolitan areas are also the engines of their states’ economies. In 2017, the
metro share of Gross State Product (GSP) exceeded 90 percent in 21 states
and 80 percent in 32 states.27 In only four states (Montana, North Dakota,
Vermont, and Wyoming) was the metro contribution to GSP lower than 50
percent of the state economy.28
The contemporary economic centrality of cities and their metropolitan
regions has been matched in recent decades by the growing role that local
governments are playing as the locus of innovation across many policy
domains. Local governments of all stripes—rural, suburban, and urban—are at
the forefront of almost every major policy concern facing the nation.
Cities, counties, and towns have been advancing new approaches to
economic development, public safety, health, housing, labor and employment,
climate change and environmental protection, technology, antidiscrimination,
broadband service, immigrant rights, and election-law reform among other
examples of local policy experimentation. Local governments have always
U.S. Conference of Mayors, U.S. Metro Economies: Economic Growth and Full Employment, Annual
GMP Report 1 (2018), http://www.usmayors.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Metro-Economies-GMPJune-2018.pdf.

24

25

Id.
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played an important regulatory role in areas such as land use and public
health, but the breadth of the exercise of the local police power in recent
decades reflects the reality that people are turning more and more to local
governments to solve pressing policy concerns.29
In the six decades since the AMA Model, moreover, urban metropolitan
areas as well as rural areas have grown in population and have experienced
significantly changing demographics. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
64 percent of Americans lived in urban areas in 1950.30 By 2010, that figure
had climbed to 81 percent.31 Those numbers are expected to increase.
Indeed, by 2050, 90 percent of the U.S. population is projected to live in
urban areas.32
America’s urban and rural population have also grown dramatically more
diverse since 1950, when, according to the Census, urban areas were 89.9
percent white and 9.7 percent nonwhite.33 In contrast, the 2010 Census
form included 15 separate response categories for race.34 According to
the Brookings Institution’s analysis of the latest data from the U.S. Census
Bureau, in 2016, America’s cities were 58.4 percent white, 19.3 percent
Hispanic, 13.2 African American, and 9.1 percent Asian-American, Native
American, Alaska Native, and other ethnicities.35 Non-urban areas are
also growing more diverse, albeit at a slower pace, with about a tenth of
bothsuburban counties (10 percent) and rural (11 percent) counties now
being majority nonwhite.36
Given all of these changes in the nature and role of local governments,
arguments for devolution and decentralization have taken on renewed
life. The case for localism consists of several related themes that center
on democratic theory, community engagement, responsive governance,
and the values of pluralism and diversity—all of which are growing more
important in the current environment.
Local legal autonomy has long been understood, for example, to foster
participation and engagement by giving force to the outcome of local
democracy, and de Tocqueville rightly saw the pragmatic give-and-take of
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1995, 1999–2002
(2018).
29

U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 26 (1953), https://www2.census.gov/
library/publications /1953/compendia/statab/74ed/1953-02.pdf.

30

Geography Program: Urban Areas Facts, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/ geography/guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural/ua-facts.html.

31

32
World Urbanization Prospects 2018, United Nations Population Division, https://population.un.org/
wup/DataQuery/ (query “Annual Percentage of Population at Mid-Year Residing in Urban Areas”;
filter to “North America” and then “United States of America”).
33

U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 30, at 35.

See, e.g., The 2010 Census Questionnaire: Seven Questions for Everyone, Population Resource
Bureau, https://www.prb.org/questionnaire.
34

William H. Frey, Census Shows Nonmetropolitan America Is Whiter, Getting Older, and
Losing Population, The Brookings Institution, June 27, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
the-avenue/2017/06/27/census-shows-nonmetropolitan-america-is-whiter-getting-olderand-losing-population/; see also William H. Frey, Six Maps That Reveal America’s Expanding
Racial Diversity, The Brookings Institution, Sept. 5, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
americas-racial-diversity-in-six-maps/?utm_campaign=Metropolitan%20Policy%20Program&utm_
source=hs_email& utm_medium=email&utm_content=76495918#cancel.

35

36
Kim Parker, et al., What Unites and Divides Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities, Pew Research
Ctr. (May 22, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/05/22/demographic-and-economictrends-in-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities.

14

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3539617

local governance as a vital means to instill public spirit. In a nation that
seems to be ever more polarized and fragmented, people still place faith in
the institutions of local governance. Without abandoning the need to find
national common ground, home rule provides space for a broader range of
communities to be heard in governance, giving voice to pluralism in a time
of global interconnection.
The immediacy of governance at the local level likewise brings a distinctive
responsiveness and ability to shape policy to respond to the particular needs
of communities. Whether responding to the opioid crisis, homelessness,
sea-level rise, the transformation of the economy brought by disruptive
technology, or any of a range of other long-standing and emerging
challenges, local governments—urban, suburban, and rural—are where the
impacts of new technology and social change are felt first and most deeply.
If there are strong reasons to modernize home rule that derive from the
evolving role that local governments are playing in governance, there are
equally important reasons that grow out of the shortcomings of extant
approaches to home rule. Both first-wave imperio home rule and the later
AMA Model reserved (or were interpreted by the courts to reserve) a great
deal of discretion on the part of state legislatures to restructure the metes
and bounds of local authority, whatever initiative power local governments
enjoyed.
States, however, are increasingly violating the spirit of this oversight
authority. North Carolina’s preemption in the spring of 2016 of an ordinance
passed by Charlotte that would have extended the city’s antidiscrimination
protections to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people brought
national attention to current state-local conflicts; similar examples have
become commonplace. At least twenty-five states, for example, currently
use their authority to preempt local minimum wage laws while twenty-two
states prohibit local paid sick leave ordinances. In the public health arena,
thirteen states now ban local food and nutrition policies, ten states prevent
local governments from regulating e-cigarettes, and forty-three states
limit the authority of local governments to regulate firearm safety. Similar
statistics can be found for policies as diverse as civil rights, the environment,
and emerging technologies (such as broadband and autonomous vehicles),
not to mention core local governance functions such as municipal finance
and local elections.37
Indeed, the fiscal health of local governments has been undermined by
a structural landscape that constrains their ability to raise revenue while
imposing burdens from the state level without adding corresponding fiscal
capacity. Home rule in many states explicitly limits local revenue authority,
and other state laws, such as California’s Proposition 13 and Colorado’s
Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, impose substantive and procedural limitations on
local fiscal power.38 And states frequently use their preemption authority
37
See generally Richard Briffault, Nestor M. Davidson & Laurie Reynolds, The New Preemption
Reader: Legislation, Cases, and Commentary on the Leading Challenge in Today’s State and
Local Government Law (2019); see also Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of
Polarization, 128 Yale L.J. 954, 965–69 (2019) (surveying a sample of state preemption statutes).
38

See Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What to Do
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to target specifi local revenue sources, such as fees on plastic bags and
congestion pricing.39 These trends pose challenges both for thriving cities
and for struggling local communities, often rural, with far fewer resources
from which to draw.
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of contemporary state efforts to
cabin local policy and fiscal authority has been the notable rise in “punitive
preemption,” with states enacting legislation that seeks to punish local
governments and local officials over policy disagreements. Some states,
for example, now have statutes that withhold critical local funding if local
governments maintain preempted policies on the books. Some states
have created novel avenues of civil liability for cities. And states are now
increasingly exposing individual local officials to removal from office,
personal civil penalties, and even potential criminal liability in preemption
conflicts.40
Trends in states cabining local self-governance also raise concerns about
disproportionate harm to, or constraints on, communities of color and
women.41 In cases like those involving efforts to raise the minimum wage in
Birmingham, Alabama, and St. Louis, Missouri, for example, majority-white
state legislatures overruled the choices of cities with large minority, if not
majority-minority, populations.42 And advocates have argued that local
policies around issues like “paid sick days, wages, and affordable housing”
as well as predictive scheduling rules have “outsized influence over the
day-to-day experiences of women, due to historical, structural, and cultural
factors,” with preemption of local policies in those areas perpetuating
existing gender inequities.43
States surely have a constructive role to play in dealing with interlocal
inequities, responding to the spillover effects of unduly restrictive local
regulation, and organizing regional solutions to problems of regional scope.
But that role must be part of a properly integrated state-local system in which
all levels of government together advance the goals of effective, equitable,
and responsive governance. That may lead to appropriately targeted curbs
on local power. But it also surely requires that democratically elected and
locally accountable local governments generally be given greater authority
to pursue the goals of their communities.

about Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 292, 296 (2016).
39

Id. at 297.

See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 20-3-10 (2017) (withholding of state funding for entities found to
violate state requirements around cooperation with immigration authorities); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§
752.053, 752.056 (2017) (specifying monetary penalties for violations of state law).

40

See, e.g., Tracy Jan, Why Nearly 350,000 Workers in Mostly Red States Aren’t Seeing Wage
Increases, Even Though Their Local Lawmakers Passed Them, Wash. Post (July 3, 2019, 11:31
AM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/03/why-nearly-workers-mostly-redstates-arent-seeing-wage-increases-even-though-their-local-lawmakers-passed-them/;Lucas
Guttentag, In Alabama, Challenging Hidden Racial Discrimination, N.Y. Times (Aug. 20, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/opinion/politics/minimum-wage-discrimination-alabama.html.

41

See, e.g., P’ship for Working Families, States Preempting Local Laws Are an Extension of Jim
Crow (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/blog/states-preempting-local-laws-areextension-jim-crow.

42

43
P’ship for Working Families, For All of Us, By All of Us: Challenging State Interference to Advance Gender
and Racial Justice 3 (2019), https://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/default/files/publications/
PWF%20Gender%20Preemption_0.pdf.
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In short, both the central importance of cities and other local governments
in contemporary governance, and the need to respond to state overreach,
together create great urgency for reexamining the fundamental structure
of home rule with broad guiding principles that recognize the value of local
democracy, innovation, resilience, and responsiveness. No level or type of
government is perfect and there can be legitimate governance concerns
at the local level. Local governments can be parochial or insular and some
have undoubtedly used their authority for invidious exclusion. As much as
these issues must be addressed—they must and can through a variety of
appropriately targeted legal doctrines—it is still critical not to let specific
local challenges be a reason to disenfranchise local governments generally.
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A Road Map to the Principles for Home Rule,
the Model Constitutional Home Rule Article,
and the Commentary to the Model Article
This publication, as noted, is organized in two sections following this
preamble. The first details four core, closely related, general principles
that seek to coalesce the most important aspects of what home rule
should mean in the contemporary environment. The following
section then translates those principles into a model constitutional
home rule article, with commentary designed both to facilitate the
adoption of the model’s provisions in state law and to shed light on
ways to approach the often open-ended constitutional and statutory
texts that make up the current landscape of home rule.
To briefly summarize the principles elaborated in the next section, their
starting point is the proposition that local governments are vital places
of self-governance and that local democracy should play a central role in
state constitutional law. The first principle accordingly ensures that local
governments of general jurisdiction are delegated, within their jurisdiction,
the full range of policymaking authority available to the state. Not all local
communities will need the entire breadth of the initiative power to solve
the policy problems they face, and there may be good reason to limit
local discretion in some situations. But moving toward this broad policy
authority was a hallmark of the AMA Model and should be reaffirmed and
strengthened in contemporary home rule.
Closely related to this is a second overarching principle that singles out local
fiscal authority as a particularly important aspect of home rule, recognizing
that the authority to act may have little meaning without the necessary
fiscal capacity. This means that local governments should be able to choose
how to raise and deploy revenue free from unreasonable state mandates.
But it also means that states should recognize that they have an affirmative
role to play in making sure that communities have a baseline of resources to
meet at least the most basic needs of their residents.
These commitments to local policy discretion and local fiscal authority
require rethinking when states may displace local action. As noted, the
Progressive Era attempt to discern a core realm of “local” or “municipal”
affairs that would be immune from state interference proved challenging
and courts have often allowed states to prevail in conflicts with local
governments by asserting overriding statewide interests. The 1953 AMA
Model’s essential bargain of broad local initiative authority coupled with
broad state preemption authority is breaking down in the face of the recent
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preemption trends, which often seem to prioritize the short-term policy,
political, or ideological goals of current state-legislative majorities over the
long-term health of maintaining a proper state-local balance.
Contemporary home rule thus requires a recalibration of this critical aspect
of the state-local relationship. There are important reasons why states might
limit or override local democracy, such as the need to address policy issues
that are best tackled at a regional scale or ensuring a minimum standard for
individual rights across an entire state. But, as the third principle requires,
states should be prepared to articulate those reasons clearly through
processes that recognize how disruptive it is to displace local governance,
and courts should not accept policy disagreement alone as a reason to
vindicate state-level preferences.
Finally, a fourth principle recognizes that contemporary home rule must
accord its highest protection—in terms of authority and constraints on
state displacement—to the core of local democracy, namely the choices
communities make in how they structure and exercise their governance.
States should have an extremely strong reason to displace local decisions
about representation and governmental structure, as well as the choices that
local governments make about their personnel and property. And punitive
state preemption, which threatens to translate policy disagreement into a
deep disincentive for public service, should play no part in contemporary
home rule.
Following the elaboration of these overarching principles, the model
constitutional home rule article that follows seeks to translate the vision for
home rule into the starting point for practical reform. The article is structured
around functional legal categories that embody the four principles, for clarity
in support of law reform efforts. The model constitutional home rule article,
finally, is accompanied by commentary that explains the ways in which the
model’s terms are grounded in, but also improve on, the experience of home
rule in states today.
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Conclusion
What Dean Fordham said in introducing the AMA Model in 1953 remains
true today: the “challenge to improve our governmental arrangements is
unending.”44 The principles and the model constitutional provisions that
accompany them below take up that challenge, reflecting lessons learned
over nearly a century and a half’s experience adopting and implementing
home rule. The principles and model provisions reaffirm and clarify the best
of what home rule has become in some states, particularly the breadth
of policy discretion available to local governments and protection from
capricious state override for choices communities make about how to
govern themselves. But in many ways, the principles seek to advance the
possibilities for home rule, particularly by elevating state responsibility for
local fiscal stability and the necessity of caution—and clear justification—
when states preempt local governments.
This holistic vision of a revitalized home rule not only is important for local
democracy but is also a foundation for states and local governments to
form a more constructive partnership in governance. Governing together
for the benefit of everyone in a state requires mutual respect, which in turn
requires formal legal recognition that each level of government has its own
vital role to play.
Cooperation between local governments is critical as well, given the larger
scale of so many policy challenges; these principles and model provisions
can foster that cooperation by placing local governance on a solid footing.
The federal government’s frequent engagement with states and local
governments in cooperative governance equally requires the clarity in the
scope of local legal autonomy that this publication seeks to foster.
The principles and their accompanying provisions undergird the formal, legal
recognition of the importance of local democracy and ensure that state
governments exercise their necessary authority over local communities with
care and precision—in other words, a home rule for the twenty-first century.

44
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Introduction
The Principles of Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century are organized around
four interrelated propositions: home rule should reinforce the breadth of authority
local governments need to solve the range of challenges they face; home rule should
advance the critical value of local fiscal authority; home rule should ensure that
states have sufficiently strong reason to displace local authority; and home rule
should respect the central importance of local democracy. This Part articulates and
explains the core idea of each of these Principles, while Part III, in turn, translates
this holistic understanding of home rule into a model constitutional home rule.

The Local Authority Principle
The Principle: A state’s law of home rule should provide
local governments full capacity to govern within their
territorial jurisdiction, including the power to adopt laws,
regulations, and policies across the full range of subjects—
and with the powers—available to the state.
This Principle addresses what is often described as the initiative power and
is meant to empower local governments of general jurisdiction, as a default
matter, to address any policy area or pursue any policy tool available to the
state, subject to state oversight that meets the terms of the Presumption
Against State Preemption Principle described below. Local-government
initiative authority is not limited to—nor does it call on courts to discern—
matters of “local affairs” or similar formulations.
This understanding of the authority of local governments to act eliminates
the traditional “private-law exception” to home rule found in some states,
in favor of relying on state oversight if local regulation unduly interferes
with contract, property, and tort. This Principle similarly presumes full
competence over criminal matters but allows states to appropriately
constrain that local authority. And this Principle recognizes that home rule
governments are fully empowered to act jointly in cooperation with other
local governments.
This Principle is reflected in Sections A and B of the Model Constitutional
Home Rule Article.
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The Local Fiscal Authority Principle
The Principle: Home rule should guarantee local fiscal authority
and recognize the value of fiscal stability at the local level. This
principle accordingly includes local power to raise revenue and
manage spending consistent with local budgets and priorities.
To support local fiscal authority, a state should ensure adequate
intergovernmental aid for general welfare at the local level and
be prohibited from imposing unreasonable unfunded mandates.
This Principle recognizes that fiscal capacity and fiscal autonomy are
critical to local governance. Accordingly, the Principle ensures not just
clear initiative authority in local fiscal matters, but also a limitation on
local revenue restrictions imposed by the state consistent with the scope
of state preemption authority that pertains to other local policymaking.
That protection includes a specific prohibition on unreasonable unfunded
state mandates directed at local governments and constraints on state tax
overrides.
However, given the often widely divergent capacity of local governments to
adequately address the general welfare of those subject to their jurisdiction,
local fiscal stability also requires that the state ensure an appropriate
structure of local funding to allow all local governments to meet those
obligations.
This Principle is reflected in Sections A, B, and D of the Model Constitutional
Home Rule Article. In particular, the grant of clear initiative authority in local
fiscal matters can be found in Section B.1, while Section E both provides a
constitutional guarantee of adequate intergovernmental aid and prohibits
unreasonable unfunded mandates.
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The Presumption Against State
Preemption Principle
The Principle: To appropriately balance state and local
authority, a system of home rule should provide that states
may only act with respect to home rule governments
expressly. And to exercise the power to preempt, the state
must articulate—and, in the case of state-local conflict,
must demonstrate—a substantial state interest, narrowly
tailored. Moreover, state laws displacing local authority
should be general, not unreasonably singling out individual
local governments or groups of local governments.
This Principle recognizes that there is a legitimate role for states to play with
respect to local authority in a regime of home rule: to ensure, for example,
the uniform operation of a well-structured statewide regulatory regime or to
remedy significant inter-local spillovers. States, moreover, retain the ability
to set regulatory floors and protect individual rights, but local governments
correspondingly retain the ability to pursue local policies that advance
those regulatory regimes and are rights-protective above the state baseline.
However, ensuring the appropriate balance between state and local
authority—recognizing the important role that each level of government
plays—requires ensuring that states do not unintentionally displace local
governance. Hence, preemption should be express. Moreover, the state
must articulate the substantial state interest at issue and state action must
be narrowly tailored to that state interest. It is not enough for a state simply
to decry the lack of uniformity, as local variation is inherent to any regime
of home rule. Indeed, courts adjudicating conflicts between states and local
governments should not simply defer to a statement of state interests;
rather, it is important that the state bear the burden of demonstrating the
state interest that justifies displacing local authority and that the given state
interference with local democracy is narrowly tailored. In many instances,
meeting that burden will not be difficult, but courts should not review statelocal conflicts under a presumption of the validity of state preemption.
Finally, respect for local democracy in a regime of home rule requires that
state laws that displace local authority meet a standard of generality. State
laws that unreasonably single out individual local governments or groups of
local governments without sufficient, clearly articulated justification would
be invalid.
This Principle is reflected in Sections A and C of the Model Constitutional
Home Rule Article.
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The Local Democratic SelfGovernance Principle
The Principle: A state’s law of home rule should
ensure that local governments have full authority to
manage their own democratic process and structure of
governance. Local democratic self-governance includes
a local government’s authority over its personnel and
property. Home rule should also protect local officials
from individual punishment by the state for the exercise
of local democracy. This protection includes barring
states from holding local officials personally liable or
removing local officials from office in the case of statelocal policy conflicts. In addition, state “speech or
debate” immunity should extend to local lawmakers. And
states should only act with respect to local democratic
self-governance through express and general state
laws that articulate an overriding state interest that is
narrowly tailored to that interest.
This final Principle addresses the core of local democracy, including issues
such as the structure of local governments—mayoral power, the function
of local legislative bodies, the scope of local administrative agencies, and
sub-delegation within local governments—as well as procedural democratic
questions, such as districting and voting rights. It also addresses the
functioning of local democracy, including the terms and conditions of the
employees of home rule governments and the role of home rule governments
as property owners and market participants. Although this Principle is as
broad in terms of initiative as a local government’s general governmental
and proprietary powers, local choices about governmental structure and
democratic process are still subject to state oversight, but protected by
a higher standard—overriding state interest, narrowly tailored—than for
ordinary local legislation and fiscal authority.
State laws that seek to punish individual local legislative and executive
officials as a means of resolving policy conflicts—including removal from
office, fines, and even criminal liability—are an increasingly significant
element of contemporary state preemption and illegitimately undermine
local democracy. This Principle of home rule would make clear that such
provisions are barred and would similarly extend state “speech or debate”
protection to local legislators.
This Principle is reflected in Sections A and D of the Model Constitutional
Home Rule Article.
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This Part of the Principles of Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century
provides a model constitutional home rule article as a starting point
for reform, as well as commentary to illuminate where the provisions
draw on existing examples of home rule in practice and where the
proposed language innovates.
As with the AMA Model Constitutional Provisions, the language below
will have to be tailored to any state that seeks to integrate these terms
with existing state-and-local-government law, whether in part or through
a process of more holistic constitutional reform. In addition, states and
local governments can use the model language and commentary below
as a guide for reforming existing home rule, given the tremendous variety
in contemporary approaches and the open-ended nature of many current
home-rule provisions.
The model provisions below are organized as a single home rule constitutional
article, with five sections. Section A articulates the foundational starting point
that the state constitution guarantees local democratic self-government
through the creation of home-rule governments. Existing home rule often
varies significantly between municipalities and counties, and generally does
not apply in the same way to special-purpose units of local governments,
such as school districts, utility districts, and the like. The extent to which
the provisions below should apply to the entire range of general-purpose
local governments is a design choice left to states reforming their system
of home rule or adopting one anew for states that do not have home rule,
recognizing that considerations vary within states as to which types of
political subdivisions play which kinds of roles.
To preserve this flexibility, the model provisions below use the term “home
rule government” to cover every local government that the state decides
has home rule pursuant to Section A. This can include all municipalities,
or municipalities above a certain size, recognizing that some states have
set threshold population levels for home rule governments or, in some
instances, varied the extent of home rule by population tiers. It can also
include some or all counties. By the same token it excludes non-home-rule
localities, such as non-qualifying municipalities, non-qualifying counties,
and special districts. Whether an entity is a home rule government will turn
on the relevant state’s constitution and laws.
Sections B, C, and D then provide the core of what home rule means in terms
of empowering local governments and balancing state-and-local authority.
Section B provides for general regulatory and revenue initiative authority
for home rule governments and rules of interpretation for all home rule
authority. Section C creates a presumption against preemption, requiring
that any state intervention in a home rule government be express, not
implied, and only by general law. Section C also requires that state action
with respect to home rule authority provided in Section B be necessary to
serve a substantial state interest and be narrowly tailored.
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
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Section D provides a set of related provisions on terms of local democracy,
specifying that a home rule government have an elected local body and the
power to provide for and regulate local elections. It also provides that home
rule governments have the power to specify the structure and organization
of their local government, as well as their physical facilities, personnel, and
property. And the section provides a higher threshold for states to meet if
acting with respect to this core of local democracy—namely, that the state
is acting to advance an overriding state concern and only if the action is
narrowly tailored to that interest, in addition to the general law constraint
on all state action with respect to home rule governments.
Finally, Section E of the model home rule constitutional article specifies
two important obligations on the state in support of local democracy.
The first part of the section mandates that the state provide a system of
adequate intergovernmental aid to local governments, given the essential
responsibilities the state has devolved to local governments, home rule
and otherwise. The second part of the section conversely prohibits state
unfunded mandates on local governments, under conditions specified in
the provision. Both parts of Section E apply to local governments generally,
without regard to whether they have home rule. Without the fiscal authority
provided by home rule, these protections may be even more critical to nonhome-rule governments.
As detailed as these model provisions are, there are constitutional design
choices that are too granular to include in a model, leaving some technical
aspects of home rule open to states adopting and adapting this model.
For example, in many states, going back to the very first example of formal
home rule in Missouri, adoption of a city charter has been the vehicle
local governments use to claim home rule authority and immunity. The
AMA Model shifted from viewing charters as instruments through which
states could grant local authority to instruments of limitation, which is to
say that local governments did not need a charter to claim home rule. In
some states, indeed, the empowerment of local governments does not
turn on the adoption (or nonadoption) of charters but instead is inherent
in municipal status. The provisions contained below are thus agnostic on
the use of charters as the vehicle for granting or limiting home rule, instead
articulating the appropriate scope and texture of local authority, however
technically implemented, although constitutional reformers could choose
to return to the charter as an instrument through which local democracy is
advanced.
Questions, moreover, of incorporation, annexation, de-annexation,
consolidation, and the like interact with home rule in many important ways
and impact the nature of local democracy. The 1953 AMA Home Rule Model
explicitly acknowledged the need at times for local boundaries to change
in response to changing conditions of population and need. In response to
that need, the Model recommended that “[t]he legislature shall, by such law,
facilitate the extension of municipal boundaries to the end that municipal
territory may readily be made to conform to the actual urban area.” Beyond
that, the provision acknowledged that to keep the boundaries of home rule
units immutable would be to make metropolitan responses impossible.
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Because the model provisions below primarily set forth a structure to balance
state and local authority, they do not address boundary issues directly,
although they do specify that the state must have home rule governments.
As with charters, state constitutional reform could include modifying how
a state approaches boundary questions, and nothing below is meant to
suggest that there might not be a substantial interest in any given instance
in scaling aspects of governance to the needs of a metropolitan region.
The commentary to the provisions notes other, similar technical and design
choices left to states in implementing the model terms. What is important
about the model is that it seeks to articulate and provide means for
enacting a state and local legal relationship on the right general grounds,
acknowledging that variation across and within states is not only inevitable,
but entirely appropriate.
Finally, it bears noting that transitioning to a new model of home rule, or
adopting home rule in the first place, poses the question of the effect of new
constitutional structures on existing state and local statutes and charters, as
well as precedent interpreting those legal documents. These questions are
familiar from past reform efforts, whether from Dillon’s Rule to home rule,
or from one version of home rule to another, and that history is instructive.
In reforming home rule, states have had to consider the effect of new regimes
on existing statutes that either empower or constrain local governments.
In Missouri, for example, courts determined that the adoption of the AMA
Model of home rule shifted the role of pre-existing municipal charters from
a grant of municipal power to a restriction on municipal power. See State ex
inf. Hannah ex rel. Christ v. City of St. Charles, 676 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. 1984).
By contrast, the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 explicitly declared that the
transition to a uniform statewide system of home rule would not diminish
the powers of existing home rule governments. See City of New Orleans v.
Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 640 So. 2d 237, 241 (La. 1994).
Similarly, state courts have had to reconcile precedent established
under prior home rule or Dillon’s Rule systems with new law. In some
states the courts have fully imported prior precedent, declaring in effect
that constitutional change had no substantive effects. See, e.g., City of
Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (Pa. 2004) (finding that the 1968
Constitution did not invalidate precedent regarding home rule despite a
transition from an imperio system to AMA Model home rule). In other states,
there have been limited transitions where certain categories of precedent
or existing legislation have been found invalidated by the new constitutional
order. See, e.g., Caulfield v. Noble, 420 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Conn. 1979) (holding
that municipal charters adopted following the ratification of a home rule
amendment supersede any preexisting special legislation governing the
municipality).
Finally, some state courts evaluating home-rule reform have declared a
clean break with pre–home rule precedent. See, e.g., Kanellos v. Cook Cty.,
290 N.E.2d 240, 243–44 (Ill. 1972) (holding that the 1970 Illinois Constitution
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fundamentally reshaped the constitutional order between municipalities
and the state and thus prior restrictions on municipal power were invalid).
As this brief discussion makes clear, there will be a range of technical
questions any state transitioning its system of home rule will have to work
through and it is beyond the scope of the model constitutional home rule
article below to work through the myriad of state-specific variations that
law reform will present. Should a state transition, for example, from a system
in which charter adoption is required for home rule to one in which home
rule is not tied to charters, the state will have to address the impact of
existing charters. Should a state transition from a system in which charters
are not required for home rule to one in which they are, some provision
should be made to allow local governments the opportunity to adopt or
amend existing charters to conform. Many similar transition choices will be
present in any reform effort.
Given that states have reformed home rule repeatedly since Missouri
adopted the first constitutional home rule provision in 1875, this is hardly a
new challenge, and the task of reconciling new law with existing statutes and
precedent is not unique to home rule by any means. From past transitions,
however, there is much to commend states that have taken seriously the
effect of new law—not simply reinstating prior precedent—for the genuine
reform that such constitutional change has brought.
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Model State Home Rule
Constitutional Article
Section A.
Home Rule and Local Self-Government
1.

Section A
Commentary is on
page 35.

The state shall provide for the establishment of general-purpose
home rule local governments that provide the people with local selfgovernment under the terms of this Article.

Section B.
Local Authority

Section B
Commentary is on
page 36.

1.

A home rule government may exercise any power within its territorial
limits not prohibited by this constitution or by a state law that complies
with Section C of this Article. This grant of authority to home rule
governments includes the authority both to raise and to spend funds,
as well as to determine the provision of public goods and services.

2.

A home rule government may exercise the full extent of its home rule
authority when acting jointly with any other unit of local government.
Any laws governing the abilities of home rule governments to engage
in inter-local cooperation shall be construed in favor of allowing such
cooperation. Where a home rule government acts in cooperation
with any other unit of government, or where inter-local cooperation
results in the creation of a new governmental entity, the participating
governments or resulting entity may exercise any power that any one
of the participating units of government has the power to exercise
separately.

3.

Interpretation of Local Authority
a. The rule of law that any doubt as to the existence of a power
of a home rule government shall be resolved against its existence is
abrogated, to the extent that any such rule was ever recognized in this
jurisdiction.
b. Any doubt as to the existence of a power of a home rule
government shall be resolved in favor of its existence. This rule applies
even when a statute granting the power in question has been repealed.
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Section C
Commentary is on
page 46.

Section C.
The Presumption Against Preemption
1.

The state shall not be held to have denied a home rule government any
power or function unless it does so expressly.

2.

The state may expressly deny a home rule government a power or
function encompassed by Section B of this Article only if necessary
to serve a substantial state interest, only if narrowly tailored to that
interest, and only by general law pursuant to Section C.3 of this Article.

3.

To constitute a general law, a statute must
a.

be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment;

b. apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformlythroughout
the state;
c. set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport
only to grant or limit legislative power of a home rule government to
set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations; and
d.
4.

32

prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.

A home rule government may exercise and perform concurrently with
the state any governmental, corporate, or proprietary power or function
to the extent that the Legislature has not preempted local law pursuant
to the preceding paragraphs. In exercising concurrent authority, a
home rule government may not set standards and requirements that
are lower or less stringent than those imposed by state law, but may
set standards and requirements that are higher or more stringent than
those imposed by state law, unless a state law provides otherwise.
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Section D.
Local Democratic Self-Government
1.

The lawmaking body of every home rule government shall be locally
elected.

2.

A home rule government shall have the power to determine the
structure and organization of its government, including providing for
local offices and determining the powers, duties, manner of selection,
and terms of office of its officers; the power to determine the terms and
conditions of its employees; and the proprietary power.

3.

Subject to the other provisions of this constitution, a home rule
government shall have the power to provide for and regulate its
elections.

4.

The elected officials of a home rule government shall enjoy the same
immunities from suit for their official votes, statements, and actions as
are provided to elected officials of the state government. Home rule
governments shall have the same immunity from suit for the exercise of
their governmental functions as is provided to the state.

5.

With respect to any aspect of local democratic self-government
specified in this Section D, the state may not displace a home rule
government’s authority unless the state is acting to advance an
overriding state concern, only if narrowly tailored to that interest, and
only by general law pursuant to Section C.3 of this Article.

Section D
Commentary is on
page 53.
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Section E
Commentary is on
page 61.

Section E.
State Support for Local Democracy
1.

Intergovernmental Aid
a. The state shall provide equitable access to adequate
intergovernmental aid to local governments in recognition of the
state’s decision to delegate the provision of essential services to
local governments. The state shall not place conditions on such
intergovernmental aid except as those conditions relate to expenditure
of that aid and the state shall not use the removal of such aid as a
penalty for the exercise of a local government’s home rule authority.

2.

Prohibiting Unfunded Mandates
a. The state shall not require local governments to provide additional
services or undertake new activities without providing an additional
appropriation that fully funds the newly mandated service or activity.
The preceding restriction shall not apply in the case of additional
services or new activities:
i.

Imposed by federal law;

ii.

Imposed by court order or legal settlement;

iii.

Imposed at the option of local governments;

iv.

Imposed as an incident to the state adding new criminal
statutes; or

v.

Imposed on both government and non-government entities in
the same or substantially similar circumstances.

Only local governments shall have standing to enforce the prohibition
on unfunded mandates. The legislature shall assign responsibility
to adjudicate local government claims under this provision to an
independent state agency.
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Commentary to the Model State
Home Rule Constitutional Article
Section A.
Home Rule and Local Self-Government
1. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.
Local self-government has long been part of the American way of life. In
the colonial era, many towns exercised broad powers and enjoyed relative
independence from provincial governments. Indeed, local governments
may have helped to create colonial “state” governments rather than the
other way around. In the early nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville
famously placed the local self-government exemplified by the New England
town meeting at the heart of his study of democracy in America. Even
in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, leading jurists like Chief
Justice Thomas M. Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court emphasized “the
vital importance which in all the states has so long been attached to local
municipal governments by the people of such localities, and their rights of
self-government.” People ex rel Leroy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich, 44, 66 (1871). To
be sure, over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century most
jurists and legal scholars came to reject the idea of an inherent legal right to
local self-government, and to treat the scope of local self-government as a
matter for the states to determine. Yet, even then, state constitutions sought
to carve out some space for local self-government. State constitutions
barred special state laws that targeted individual local governments, and
some adopted bans on state creation of special commissions to take over
local functions. Most importantly, the states began to take the first steps
toward recognizing the form of local self-government known as “home rule.”
“Home rule” is the term conventionally applied to local governments that
have been given relatively broad powers of self-government. States differ
with respect to the determination of which local governments are granted
home rule. Most states grant most of their municipalities home rule, although
some require that the municipality have reached a threshold population
before it is eligible for home rule. These thresholds range between 100 and
25,000, with 2,000 to 5,000 people the most common. Many states grant
all or some of their counties home rule, as well. See Dale Krane, Et Al., Home
Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook (2001). Table A1 indicates that
thirty-four states provide all their municipalities with home rule, and that
an additional ten provide home rule to municipalities above a population
threshold. Table A2 indicates that thirty-one states provide all counties with
home rule; five states provide home rule to a limited number of counties.
Id. at 476–78. Although this Article may apply broadly to local government,
and some of its provisions, such as those in Section E, apply to all local
governments, this Article as a whole is focused on those local governments
that have been granted home rule.
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Section B.
Local Authority
1. LOCAL AUTHORITY.
a. The Initiative Power. This provision addresses what is often described as
the initiative power—usually understood as the power to initiate legislation—
and is meant to empower home-rule governments of local government,
as a default matter, to address any subject of public policy or use any
enforcement tool available to the state. It also encompasses local decisionmaking with respect to the content and scope of local public goods and
services. The authority granted to home rule governments in Section B is
subject to state oversight consistent with the standards set forth in Section
C of this Article.
The grant of authority in Section B.1 is drafted to reject drawing a distinction
between “local” and “statewide” powers. Some home-rule provisions grant
municipalities power over “local and municipal matters.” See, e.g., N.D.
Cent. Code § 40-05.1-06(16) (2017). At times, judges have invoked this
language to hold that a city has exceeded its grant of initiative authority.
See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule:
A Role for the Courts, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 668 (1964). In order to ensure
maximum flexibility for home-rule governments to innovate with respect
to public policy and address matters of importance to their residents, and
given the inherent vagueness and manipulability of the concept of “local” or
“municipal” matters, this provision makes clear that the initiative authority is
not limited to such matters.
As explained below, Section B.3 also explicitly rejects the Dillon’s Rule
approach to the allocation of local power and its judicial interpretation.
b. Power delegated beyond “police.” Many state home-rule provisions
include the “police power”––that is, the power to promote the health, safety,
welfare, and morals of the community—among the powers delegated to
local governments. E.g., Utah Const. art. XI, § 5 (delegating “the authority
to adopt, and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary, and similar
regulations”). Some legal authorities consider the “police power” a subset of
the plenary power to legislate that state legislatures enjoy; other, separate
powers include taxing (revenue-raising) and eminent domain. See Walter
Wheeler Cook, What Is the Police Power?, 7 Colum. L. Rev. 322, 329 (1907)
(noting that the police power, like eminent domain and the power of taxation,
is a “residuary power[] of government possessed by the States in our
system”); State Regulation—Police Power—City Ordinance—City of Selma
v. Till, 42 So. 405 (Ala.), 16 Yale L. J. 445, 445–46 (1907) (distinguishing the
police power from “eminent domain or taxing power”). By referring broadly
to “any power,” this provision includes governmental powers in addition to
the police power, such as taxation and eminent domain.
With respect to eminent domain, most states have statutes that expressly
delegate that power to local governments. These statutes often impose
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procedural requirements on a city’s use of eminent domain. E.g., Wis. Stat.
§ 32.05 (2018) (describing procedure to be used in condemnation by any
entity exercising the delegated power of eminent domain). Due to concerns
about the taking of private property, some state courts construe delegations
of eminent domain strictly, e.g., Orsett/Columbia Ltd. P’ship. v. Superior
Court ex. rel. Maricopa County, 83 P.3d 608, 610 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), a
practice that would contravene Section B.3 of this Article.
This provision pointedly does not include a “private law exception” to local
power, as was common in earlier home rule provisions, including the 1953
AMA Model Constitutional provision, and remains in a few state constitutions
today. E.g., Mass Const. art. II, § 7, amended by Mass. Const. art. LXXXIX
(preventing cities from “enact[ing] private or civil law[s] governing civil
relationships except as incident to an exercise of an independent municipal
power”). Massachusetts’s provision and others like it used the wording of
the 1953 AMA proposal, which awkwardly attempted to “split the baby”
between giving cities full or highly limited power over private law. See Am.
Mun. Ass’n, Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule 18–19
(1953).
The private law exception has proved unwieldy and inconsistent in
application and, in some states, circumventable through formalistic means.
E.g., New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2005). For criticism of the “private law exception,” see Paul A. Diller,
The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1109 (2012), and
Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception,
20 UCLA L. Rev. 671 (1973). This provision intends to eradicate the private
law exception as a subject-based limit on local power, again affirming that
home-rule governments may address any subject matter of legislation or
regulation of their choosing.
c. Fiscal Authority. The 1953 AMA Model Constitutional Provisions did
not explicitly address local fiscal authority. In the succeeding years, it has
become clear that home rule requires local governments to have the power
to raise revenue. Nevertheless, fiscal authority remains limited in home-rule
jurisdictions. State law often places stringent limits on local government
efforts to generate own-source resources, even in jurisdictions that have the
fiscal capacity to raise more revenue. Richard F. Dye & Therese J. McGuire,
The Effect of Property Tax Limitation Measures on Local Government Fiscal
Behavior, 66 J. Pub. Econ. 469, 485 (1997) (“In the past 25 years the nature
of state government involvement in local government finances has become
more constraining rather than facilitating.”).
In many states, limits of fiscal authority are inherent in the state’s grant of
home rule authority, or in other provisions of a state’s constitution. See, e.g.,
Ga. Code Ann. § 36-35-6(a)(3); Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A; N.Y. Const., art.
XVI. In other states, courts have concluded that the police powers granted
under the state’s home rule provisions do not include taxing authority. See,
e.g., Arborwood Idaho, L.L.C. v. City of Kennewick, 89 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash.
2004); City of Plymouth v. Elsner, 135 N.W.2d 799, 801–02 (Wis. 1965).
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Even in states that grant local governments more expansive tax authority,
other restrictions can limit local fiscal control. First, many state laws broadly
preempt local taxing authority. For example, Kansas grants taxing authority
under its home rule provisions, but the state preempts local governments
from imposing excise taxes other than sales taxes and corresponding use
taxes. See Heartland Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Mission, 392 P.3d 98,
105 (Kan. 2017). Local taxing authority has also been attacked as part of
the new wave of preemption. See Eric Crosbie, et al., State Preemption to
Prevent Local Taxation of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, JAMA Internal Med.
(2019) (listing preemption efforts in nine states). See also State Plastic and
Paper Bag Legislation, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Nov. 1, 2019),
www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/plastic-baglegislation.aspx (identifying thirteen states that prohibit the regulation of
plastic bags, including bag taxes and fees).
Thus, even the explicit provision for local fiscal authority in Section B.1 must
also be protected by the strong presumption against preemption contained
in Section C of this Article. As in other areas, the transition to local fiscal
home rule will raise questions about the relationship between local authority
and existing state constitutional and statutory law. Under this provision,
prior legislation that grants local governments taxing authority on the
condition that they adhere to state-imposed constraints should no longer
bind local governments’ tax-design choices. Rather, this provision provides
independent authority for local governments’ taxing authority. State laws,
however, that explicitly preempt local taxing authority or condition such
authority on adherence to state-imposed procedural standards should be
evaluated under the terms of Section C of this Article.
Of particular concern for many local governments are state-imposed tax
and expenditure limitations. Some of these restraints impose onerous rules
on localities seeking to impose new taxes or to raise tax rates. For example,
under Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, local governments must generally
seek voter approval for “any new tax, tax rate increase, mill levy above that
for the prior year, valuation for assessment ratio increase for a property
class, or extension of an expiring tax, or a tax policy change directly causing
a net tax revenue gain to any district.” Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(4). See also
Mich. Const. art. IX, § 25; Mo. Const. art. X, 11(c), §16.
State laws also frequently impose particular restrictions on property tax
revenue. As of 2010, all but six states imposed some limits on local property
taxation. David Brunori, Local Tax Policy: A Federalist Perspective 59
(3d ed. 2013). The limits vary widely in substance. Some provisions limit
growth in assessed valuations, while others limit increases in property
tax rates, and some address both. Some states have also limited revenue
growth directly. See Lincoln Inst. on Land Policy, Tax Limits, https://
www.lincolninst.edu/research-data/data-toolkits/significant-featuresproperty-tax/topics/property-tax-limits (providing a manipulated table
listing tax limits by state, type, and year of enactment). Even as residents
consistently support raising property tax levy limits in local elections, there
have been few serious efforts to revoke these limits, and states continue to
pass them. In 2019, Texas enacted a restriction requiring voter approval for
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jurisdictions to raise their property tax revenue by more than 3.5 percent in
a year. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 26.08.
Historically, local governments in the United States have relied on the
property tax base to fund local services, and it remains the dominant source
of local own-source revenue. See State and Local Finance Initiative, Urban
Inst., https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/stateand-local-finance-initiative/state-and-localbackgrounders/state-and-localrevenues#local. As a result, these limits are significant constraints on local
fiscal authority. In states with the most onerous restrictions, property tax
revenue decreased 15 percent or more after implementation. See Brunori,
supra at 59.
Reforming these limits is a critical step in ensuring local fiscal authority.
Nevertheless, these model provisions do not address property tax
limitations directly. Of course, to the extent that these provisions are
statutory, Section C of this Article applies to constrain such state statutes.
Many of these restrictions, however, are imposed by state constitutions. For
those constitutional restrictions, this model assumes changes should be
addressed by separate constitutional reform, given the prominence of these
provisions in the politics of the various jurisdictions.
Finally, many states grant more expansive local authority to impose fees,
as an extension of the grant of general police powers. States vary widely
in the terminology they use to describe such fees and in the way they
define and limit local authority over them. Local governments across the
country, however, have faced litigation challenging their authority to impose
various fees by alleging that they are disguised taxes. See generally Erin A.
Scharff, Green Fees: The Challenge of Pricing Externalities Under State Law,
97 Neb. L. Rev. 168 (2018). For a discussion of the challenges in defining
user fees in a particular jurisdiction, see Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A
Curious Confusion, 38 Gonz. L. Rev. 335 (2003) (discussing judicial efforts in
Washington state to differentiate between taxes and fees).
Courts, for example, have struggled to categorize stormwater fees imposed
by local jurisdictions to pay for infrastructure improvements to their storm
drainage systems. See Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich.
1998) (finding stormwater charge a tax); Zweig v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 412 S.W.3d 223, 248–49 (Mo. 2013) (finding stormwater charge a tax);
compare Teter v. Clark County, 704 P.2d 1171, 1181 (Wash. 1985) (finding
stormwater charge a fee); Vandergriff v. City of Chattanooga, 44 F. Supp.
2d 927, 941 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (finding stormwater charge a fee); Church
of Peace v. City of Rock Island, 828 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(finding stormwater charge a fee); McLeod v. Columbia County, 599 S.E.2d
152, 155-56 (Ga. 2004) (finding stormwater charge a fee). In granting local
authority to raise revenue, this provision provides broad authority for local
governments to impose both taxes and fees and seeks to reduce litigation
of these definitional questions, which can be especially challenging.
In the wake of the Department of Justice’s investigation of Ferguson,
Missouri, moreover, there has been significant attention, and criticism, of
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local fee authority, especially in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Beth
Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 277 (2014);
Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day
Debtors’ Prisons, 75 Md. L. Rev. 486 (2016). While these provisions grant
local governments broad revenue authority, they must use their revenue
authority consistent with other principles of state and federal law and with
due regard for the potentially serious consequences of the exercise of that
authority. To the extent that local governments are turning to onerous
criminal justice fees because of their otherwise limited fiscal authority, this
provision should also relieve some of that pressure.
d. Executive power. In home-rule governments with a chief executive such
as a mayor, the municipality may choose to grant that chief executive
powers comparable to those enjoyed by the state’s governor. The precise
division of legislative and executive power is a matter of core governmental
design for local governments to decide in the first instance. See Section D.2
of this Article. The extent of the chief executive’s powers may be delineated
in the home rule government’s charter or defined by ordinary legislation of
the government’s lawmaking body. Such executive powers might include
declaring emergencies, imposing quarantines, and pardoning those persons
convicted of municipal crimes. See Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking
in Crisis, 56 Duke L.J. 237 (2006) (discussing gubernatorial emergency
powers). As with zoning and eminent domain, states have delegated some
of these powers to local executives by statute, and courts have relied on
these more specific statutes to define the contours of local executive power.
E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 77.360 (The mayor shall have power to … grant reprieves
and pardons for offenses arising under ordinances of the city”); Ervin v.
State, 163 N.W.2d 207 (Wis. 1968) (upholding Milwaukee mayor’s curfew
proclamation that was in compliance with state statute so authorizing).
Under this provision, such statutory delegations are no longer necessary,
although states may preempt or constrain local executive power expressly,
under the constraints of Section C of this Article. Contra Walsh v. City of
River Rouge, 189 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. 1971) (holding that a mayor’s power to
declare an emergency was impliedly preempted by a state statute that gave
the governor the exclusive power to declare an emergency).
e. Judicial power. Counties often already play a role in funding and staffing
trial courts, but these courts are generally the first level of a state unified
judicial system. In some states, cities have the option to create municipal
courts, often for the primary purpose of prosecuting violations and
misdemeanors committed within the city’s jurisdiction. E.g., Ore. Rev. Stat. §
221.339 (allocating to municipal courts “concurrent jurisdiction with circuit
courts and justice courts over all violations committed or triable in the city
where the court is located” and over most misdemeanors). This model
provision would allow home-rule governments to create municipal courts,
with the understanding that any such courts would be under the control of
a unified state court system, which would have authority over matters like
rules of procedure and the disciplining of attorneys and judges.
Due to concerns regarding some cities’ aggressive use of their police
and court systems to raise revenue by assessing fines on both residents
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and nonresidents, as noted above, municipal courts should aid cities’
enforcement powers, not serve as an independent means for raising
revenue. See, e.g., Henry Ordower et al., Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors,
Municipal Courts, Tax Distribution, and Constitutional Limitations, 61 How.
L.J. 113, 127 (2017) (describing as “troubling” the practice of “[s]ome St.
Louis County municipalities deriv[ing] a substantial, regular, and predictable
portion of their municipal revenue from the fines, costs, and fees imposed
by … municipal courts”).
f. Enforcement mechanisms, including private rights of action and criminal
law. Most cities and counties enforce their ordinances through civil fines, and
such enforcement would be consistent with this provision. Moreover, any
state limitations on such authority would be subject to the terms of Section
C of this Article. With respect to civil enforcement, this provision presumes
that home-rule governments have the authority to create private rights of
action that can be enforced in municipal or state court. This dynamic may
raise concerns about local governments commandeering state courts, but
the state legislature, of course, retains the power to preempt under Section
B of this Article and to establish rules of jurisdiction for state court. Moreover,
cities and counties may establish administrative agencies to hear local civil
actions in the first instance, as is common in the antidiscrimination context.
Diller, City and the Private Right, supra at 1150 (discussing local human
rights commissions that adjudicate complaints of housing, employment,
and public accommodations discrimination); David B. Goldin & Martha I.
Casey, New York City Administrative Tribunals: A Case Study in Opportunity
for Court Reform, 49 Judges’ J. 20, 20 (2010) (discussing the breadth of
administrative tribunals in New York City); see also Nestor M. Davidson,
Localist Administrative Law, 126 Yale L.J. 564 (2017).
With respect to criminal law, the current landscape for local enforcement
is more mixed. In some states, some cities and counties use the criminal
law as an additional means to enforce ordinances, generally through
misdemeanors. 9A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 27:6 (3d ed. July 2019 update)
(discussing criminal and “quasi-criminal” nature of municipal enforcement).
In some of these instances, cities re-criminalize behavior that is already
criminalized by state law, although because cities are considered arms of
the state under federal constitutional law, double jeopardy bars trying a
defendant for both the municipal and state versions of the same crime. See
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). In other instances, cities criminalize
behavior beyond that which is already criminalized by state law, thus adding
to the potential criminal liability of individuals and firms. In New York City,
for instance, it is a potential criminal offense for subway passengers to put
their feet up on another subway seat. See 21 NYCRR, ch. XXI, § 1050(7)(j)
(2); see also Joseph Goldstein & Christine Haughney, Relax, if You Want, but
Don’t Put Your Feet Up, N.Y. Times (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/01/07/nyregion/minor-offense-on-ny-subway-can-bring-ticket-orhandcuffs.html (noting that officers can enforce this provision through
violation tickets, but nonetheless arrested 1,600 people for this crime in
2011).
Because it can deprive an individual of liberty and impose collateral
consequences for life, the criminal law is an extremely powerful tool for
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any level of government to wield. Cf. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1128
(Utah 1980) (Maughan, J., dissenting) (“The police power is awesome, for
it confers the right to declare an act a crime and to deprive an individual
of his liberty or property in order to protect or advance the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare.”). Hence, it is understandable that cities seeking
maximum flexibility would want the option of enforcing their policy choices
through the criminal law.
There are, however, legitimate concerns that allowing cities to create
misdemeanors may ensnare uninformed persons, especially nonresidents
passing through often-imperceptible municipal boundaries. See, e.g.,
Francis H. Bohlen & Harry Shulman, Arrest With and Without a Warrant, 75
U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 491–92 (1927) (“Even that outworn and discredited fiction
that every man knows the law has never been pushed to such an extreme as
to justify imposing [criminal] consequences upon an ignorance of the local
ordinances of the myriads of small communities through which modern men
constantly pass.”); Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal
Governance, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1409 (2001). Local criminal lawmaking authority
might also continue the baleful trend of over-criminalization of conduct that
some states and the federal government have begun to attempt to reverse.
Concerns about “over-criminalization,” or the use of criminal law to pursue
public policy objectives for which it is poorly suited, are at least 50 years
old. E.g., Sanford Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 Annals Am.
Acad. of the Political & Soc. Sci. 157 (1967). In the last decade, the massive
size of the nation’s prison population, increased recognition of racial and
economic disparities in criminal enforcement, and heightened awareness
of lifelong collateral consequences for even the most minor crimes have
sparked much discussion and some progress toward reducing the criminal
law’s massive footprint. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (2010);
Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 Mich.
L. Rev. 259, 261–62 (2018) (discussing the concepts of “mass incarceration”
and “overcriminalization” and efforts to address).
Whether rooted in these concerns or not, several states prohibit their local
governments—even those that possess some version of “home rule”—from
criminalizing any behavior. See, e.g., State v. Thierfelder, 495 N.W.2d 669,
673 (Wis. 1993) (holding that “municipalities cannot create crimes”). Even
in some states where local criminal lawmaking is allowed, several expressly
disallow the creation of local felonies. See, e.g., 22 Del. Code. § 802 (“This
grant of power does not include the power … to define and provide for
the punishment of a felony”); Mass Const. art. II, § 7, amended by Mass.
Const. art. LXXXIX (preventing cities from “defin[ing] and provid[ing] for
the punishment of a felony or … impos[ing] imprisonment as a punishment
for any violation of law”). The 1953 AMA Model Home Rule Provision also
forbade local felonies, without providing justification. See Am. Mun. Ass’n,
supra, at 21 (“It has been considered desirable to make it clear that [the
power to define and provide for the punishment of offenses] stops short of
serious offenses which fall in the felony category”). Oregon takes a uniquely
skeptical approach to local criminal lawmaking authority that is based on
the idiosyncratic wording of its home-rule provision: courts presume that
local criminal ordinances are preempted, whereas local ordinances that
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are civilly enforced are not. See Or. Const. art. XI, § 2 (“The legal voters
of every city and town are hereby granted power to enact and amend
their municipal charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the
State of Oregon”); Paul A. Diller, The Partly Fulfilled Promise of Home Rule
in Oregon, 87 Or. L. Rev. 939, 949–955 (2009) (reviewing cases involving
municipal criminal law).
For maximum flexibility and logical consistency, this provision permits
home-rule governments the same extent of criminal lawmaking as the state.
This language is included in the model Article, however, with awareness of
the serious concerns regarding local criminal lawmaking, and policymakers
should think carefully about the tradeoffs before enacting the proposed
language.
g. Territorial Limits of Power. The model provision makes clear that the
powers granted by it apply only within the city’s or county’s territorial
jurisdiction. For a home-rule unit to exercise its governmental powers outside
of its territory, additional statutory permission would be required. This
approach stands in contrast to that of at least one state, which guarantees
extraterritorial eminent domain authority to home-rule municipalities in its
constitution. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161
(Colo. 2008) (upholding town’s extraterritorial use of eminent domain as
against countervailing state law in light of Colorado constitutional provision
read to guarantee such powers).

2. HOME RULE AND INTER-LOCAL COOPERATION.
The local authority protected by this provision empowers home rule
governments to take a variety of actions, and Sections C and D of this
Article provide a sphere of autonomy vis-à-vis state government. Local
governments will use that authority to take action on a variety of issues.
While many local policies will have purely local impact, others will have
extra-local ramifications without being directly extraterritorial. This provision
makes clear that with the local autonomy and flexibility set out in these
provisions, home rule governments also have the authority to work with
other units of government to address significant cross-boundary issues and
to fulfill extra-local obligations.
Some courts—particularly in policy areas such as housing and the
environment—have reminded local governments of their affirmative
obligation to consider the impact of local policy on others outside the
jurisdiction who might be significantly affected by the government’s
exercise of its delegated police power authority. See, e.g., Associated
Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 487 (Cal. 1976)
(holding that “the proper constitutional test [for whether a public ordinance
relates to the public welfare] is one which inquires whether the ordinance
reasonably relates to the welfare of those whom it significantly affects…
. [if] the ordinance may strongly influence the supply and distribution of
housing for an entire metropolitan region, judicial inquiry must consider
the welfare of that region.”); Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 725, 726 (N.J. 1975) (noting that “a
zoning regulation, like any police power enactment, must promote public
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health, safety, morals or the general welfare,” including the welfare of those
outside the boundaries of a particular locality, and that “when regulation
does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state’s citizens
beyond the borders of the particular municipality … must be recognized
and served”). The Supreme Court too has recognized the possibility that
extra-local impacts may impose limits on local governments. See Vill. of
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (noting that its
decision upholding a local government’s exercise of its zoning authority did
not “exclude the possibility of cases where the general public interest would
so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would
not be allowed to stand in the way”).
In short, this provision acknowledges the general welfare limits embodied
in many state constitutions as a possible limit on local authority exercised
in accordance with this Article. See Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma
of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 Yale L.J. 954, 990–92 (2019).
Moreover, states may have a substantial interest in ensuring that home
rule governments share in the social, economic, environmental, or other
responsibilities of a metropolitan area or region in which they are located,
and that state interest could meet the requirements of Sections C and D of
this Article, if tailored appropriately.
Provisions authorizing home rule governments to engage in cooperative
regimes are common in the states, although some states include not just
interlocal cooperation but also cooperation with persons, corporations,
Native American tribes, and other public or private agencies. See, e.g., Fla.
Stat. § 163.01; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-2904; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 124.501-124.512;
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 70.220; Tex. Gov. Code § 791.011. This provision leaves open
to states the choice of how broadly to grant cooperating authority.
Some states provide for specific processes that must be complied with when
local governments enter into cooperative intergovernmental agreements
(IGAs). For example, Washington requires all IGAs to be filed with the
county auditor or, alternatively, to be “listed by subject on a public agency’s
web site or other electronically retrievable public source.” Wash. Rev. Code
§ 39.34.040. Utah also requires specific approval processes for certain kinds
of intergovernmental agreements. Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-202.5 (requiring
intergovernmental agreements related to law enforcement or contracts for
services to comply with specified procedures for approval). A number of
other states require that all intergovernmental agreements be approved by
a state official before the agreement may enter into force. E.g., Ark. Code
Ann. § 25-20-104 (requiring approval by state attorney general); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 12-2904(g) (requiring approval by state attorney general); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 65.260 (requiring approval by state attorney general or Department
of Local Government); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 74, § 1004 (requiring approval by
state attorney general). This provision assumes local initiative in the absence
of state procedural oversight. Any such state limitations would be subject to
Section C of this Article.
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3. INTERPRETATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY.
a. Breadth of Authority. Section B.1 phrases its grant of initiative power in
the broadest possible terms. Sections B.3.a and b, in turn, clearly repudiate
Dillon’s Rule as applied to home-rule governments and require any
ambiguity with respect to local authority to be read in favor of the authority
of home rule governments. Courts have historically invoked Dillon’s Rule to
construe grants of authority to local governments narrowly. See 2 McQuillin
Mun. Corp. § 4:11 (3d ed. July 2019 update) (discussing the history of Dillon’s
Rule and modern applications). Prominent examples of states that retain
Dillon’s Rule include Nevada and Virginia. See id. (discussing Dillon’s Rule
as administered in Virginia, Vermont, Arkansas, and Mississippi); Louis V.
Csoka, The Dream of Greater Municipal Autonomy: Should the Legislature
or the Courts Modify Dillon’s Rule, a Common Law Restraint on Municipal
Power?, 29 N.C. Cent L.J. 194, 204 (2007) (noting that “legal authorities have
consistently applied Dillon’s Rule to all cities and counties in Nevada”). Some
states have expressly repudiated Dillon’s Rule, either by statute or judicial
opinion. E.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 36-1-3 (abrogating Dillon’s Rule by statute);
State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1127 (Utah 1980) (holding that Dillon’s
Rule no longer applies to counties). Many other states intended to abrogate
Dillon’s Rule through their state constitutional home-rule provisions; while
mostly successful, in a few of these states, the judiciary has clung to Dillon’s
Rule nonetheless. See, e.g., Hugh Spitzer, “Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for
Washington Cities, 38 Seattle U. L. Rev. 809, 858–59 (2015) (noting that in
Washington, despite its constitutional home rule provision, Dillon’s Rule “lives
on in judicial discourse” and seeps into decisions involving municipalities to
which it should not apply). In conjunction with Sections C and D of this
Article, this provision makes clear that Dillon’s Rule is no longer applicable
as a matter of power allocation or judicial interpretation.
b. Statutory grant of authority unnecessary. To the extent that state
statutes already delegate certain powers to home-rule units, such
delegations are likely no longer necessary after this provision is added to a
state’s constitution. For instance, a home-rule unit would have the power to
zone property within its jurisdiction regardless of whether such power was
specifically previously delegated by a zoning enabling act. However, prior
delegations that contained procedural limitations or requirements, see, e.g.,
Wis. Stat. § 32.05 (2018) (describing procedure to be used in condemnation
by any entity exercising the delegated power of eminent domain), would
have to be tested against the standards articulated in Section C of this Article,
unless such conditions infringed on the structure and organization of the
home-rule government, in which case they would be subject to the terms of
Section D. States adopting this provision, therefore, would be encouraged
eventually to repeal or revise such previous delegations that this provision
makes superfluous. To facilitate such potential statutory housecleaning,
section B.3.b makes clear that the repeal of what was previously a statutory
grant of authority does not derogate the constitutional powers granted by
the provision.
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Section C.
The Presumption Against Preemption
INTRODUCTION: HOME RULE AND THE PROBLEM OF
STATE PREEMPTION.
Without meaningful limits on the ability of state legislatures to override
local laws, constitutional home rule provisions can easily be circumvented,
and the concept of home rule as an enforceable division of authority can
lose its meaning. While home rule initiative permits local governments to
act without prior authorization from the legislature, the need for some
level of home rule immunity from state legislative overreach has become
increasingly apparent.
This Section responds to the need for a constitutional check on state law
preemption of local laws. The state retains broad authority to legislate on all
matters within its competence, but state legislation has increasingly been
used to target local laws, effectively undercutting local governments’ basic
ability to govern, often in areas that only minimally implicate state interests.
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70
Stan. L. Rev. 1995, 1999–2008 (2018); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on
American Cities, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 1163, 1169–1183 (2018). The provision provides
several constitutional checks on state legislative efforts to control local
governments through preemptive legislation by barring implied preemption,
setting a substantive standard by which to evaluate the constitutionality
of state legislative action that displaces local laws, adopting a generality
requirement for state legislation, and providing for concurrent regulation.
Each part of the provision is designed to address a particular aspect of the
rise in state legislative preemption of local government action. Examples of
recent local regulations that likely would be insulated from state override
under this provision include local minimum wage laws, plastic bag bans, and
antidiscrimination ordinances.
As the size and needs of home rule governments have multiplied in the
last century, so too have the number of preemption cases stemming from
conflicts between state and local laws. When such conflicts arise, courts
must determine if and to what degree state law expressly or implicitly
preempts the local law. In the majority of states, state law can be found to
preempt local law either way. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L.
Rev. 1113, 1140–42 (2007). Where state law expressly preempts the local law,
the court’s job is a fairly easy one, but where there is no express preemption,
courts are faced with the frustrating job of determining whether or not a
state law implicitly preempts a local law and to what degree. See Diller,
Intrastate Preemption, supra (describing the vast, complex, and largely
unsatisfactory way in which courts consider implied preemption); Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 262–64 (2000) (noting the difficulty
of differentiating between “express” and “implied,” let alone determining
what is and is not “implied”).

1. NO IMPLIED PREEMPTION.
This provision avoids much of this difficulty by providing that the state may
only rely on express forms of preemption to restrict the power of home
rule governments—implied preemption may not be used. This obviates
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the need for courts to undertake the fraught task of speculating about
the intentions and motivations of state legislators to determine if state law
preempts the local law. Following this approach, courts need only ask if
state law expressly preempts the local law. This “express-only” approach to
state preemption is currently enshrined to varying degrees in several state
constitutional and statutory home rule regimes. See, e.g., Ill. Const. Art. VII,
§§ 6(g)-6(h) (establishing that the state may only preempt the authority of
home rule governments by laws specifically crafted for that purpose); Fla.
Stat. § 166.021 (2019) (municipalities “may exercise any power for municipal
purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law”); Me. Stat. tit. 30-A,
§ 3001 (2017) (“The Legislature shall not be held to have implicitly denied
any power granted to municipalities under this section unless the municipal
ordinance in question would frustrate the purpose of any state law.”).
“Express-only” preemption not only simplifies the role of the courts in
resolving issues of state and local law conflict, it also protects the power of
home rule governments by raising the bar for a finding of preemption and
significantly limiting the degree to which the judiciary can read preemptive
intent into state constitutional or statutory text. See D’Agastino v. City of
Miami, 220 So.3d 410, 422 (Fla. 2017) (“a finding of express preemption—
that the Legislature has specifically expressed its intent to preempt a subject
through an explicit statement—is a very high threshold to meet”); Scadron
v. City of Des Plaines, 606 N.E.2d 1154, 1163 (Ill. 1992) (observing that the
“express-only” approach adopted in Illinois’s constitution was designed to
“eliminate or at least reduce to a bare minimum the circumstances under
which local home rule powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of
unexpressed legislative intention”). As a result, where the “express-only”
approach is employed, home rule governments have successfully blocked
preemptive findings in state court. See, e.g., Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive
Condo. Ass’n, 988 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ill. 2013) (“If the legislature intends to limit or
deny the exercise of home rule powers, the statute must contain an express
statement to that effect”); Neri Bros. Const. v. Vill. of Evergreen Park, 841
N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ill. 2005) (refusing to find that a state regulation regarding
gas lines implicitly preempted the authority of local home rule governments
and remarking “that any limitation on the power of home rule units by
the General Assembly must be specific, clear, and unambiguous” and that
“absent such a limitation, [courts] will not find preemption”); Cincinnati Bell
Telephone Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 693 N.E. 2d 212 (Ohio 1998) (rejecting
implied preemption in assessing the municipal taxing power).

2. SUBSTANTIAL STATE INTEREST AND 		
NARROW TAILORING.
Institutional designers as well as courts have employed differing approaches
to determining when a state law preempts a local law. In some states,
conflicts between state and local laws are always resolved in favor of the
state, which has the absolute power to preempt local laws. See Diller,
Intrastate Preemption, supra. In other states, courts determine whether
the state law concerns a matter of purely local concern, a matter of state
concern, or a matter of mixed state and local concern. See, e.g., City of
Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151 (Colo. 2003). If the conflicting state law
concerns a matter of exclusively local concern, then the local law will prevail.
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The drawback of the first approach is obvious—it imposes no limits on the
state’s preemptive power. The drawback of the second approach is that it
requires courts to determine what issues are of local, mixed, or statewide
concern. In cases of conflict, states can readily argue that any given area of
regulation has statewide implications. The judicial determination thus tends
to rubber-stamp the legislature’s asserted justification.
A different approach employs procedural barriers to state preemptive laws,
either requiring a supermajority vote of the state legislature, see Ill. Const. art.
VII, § 6(g); see also City of Rockford v. Gill, 388 N.E.2d 384, 386 (Ill. 1979), or
by requiring that any preemption measure be enacted during one legislative
session and then re-enacted during a successive legislative session before it
becomes valid. See, e.g., N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(a)(1). These legislative barriers
to the adoption of preemptive legislation are often narrowly construed,
which reduces their effectiveness. See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41
N.Y.2d 490, 494-95 (N.Y. 1977) (reading the state constitution’s successive
session requirement narrowly and allowing the legislature to diminish local
power after only one session where “the subject matter in need of legislative
attention was of sufficient importance to the State, transcendent of local or
parochial interests or concerns”). Nonetheless, for those concerned with a
heightened judicial involvement in weighing the propriety of preemption, a
procedural mechanism for constraining preemption may be preferred.
This provision instead adopts a substantive standard for when a state may
override local laws. That standard does not attempt to distinguish between
local and statewide affairs, but instead permits the state to override local
laws only when it has a substantial state interest and only if the state law
is narrowly tailored to that interest. It thus adopts from state and federal
case law a proportionality requirement: the ends must be justified as well
as the means. Cf. Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992) (adopting a
narrow tailoring requirement). Even if the state’s interests are appropriately
substantial, if the state can achieve its interests without preempting local
authority, then it should be required to do so. Overbroad state restrictions
on home rule government authority would be impermissible under the
narrowly tailoring requirement.
The substantiality standard is appropriately high. It requires that the state
come forth with independent, substantial reasons for statewide regulation.
Simply expressing a policy disagreement with local governments is not
sufficient.
This standard reflects the view that regulatory diversity is a benefit and
not a cost. State officials and courts frequently point to a state’s interest
in uniformity as a justification for the preemption of local law. See, e.g.,
City of Laredo v. Laredo Merchants Ass’n, 550 S.W.3d 586, 604 (Tex. 2018)
(Guzman, J. & Lehrmann, J., concurring) (“[V]ariations come with associated
costs of production and compliance[,] [a] patchwork of disparate local
regulations has the practical effect of allowing the most restrictive local
ordinance to set the state-wide standard”). Because a diversity of regulatory
approaches is one of the benefits of local self-government, courts should
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evaluate skeptically claims that statewide uniformity is necessary in any
given context. Uniformity alone is not a sufficient reason for state law
preemption. Disuniformity has to be “so pervasive” as to cause substantial
and demonstrable harm. See New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa
Fe, 126 P.3d 1149 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
That is not to say that comprehensive regulatory schemes are never useful
because of their consistent and uniform application. Rather, the standard
recognizes that the aggregate benefits from laboratories of regulatory
experimentation may outweigh whatever costs may be imputed to a lack
of uniformity, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), and
that state preemption may not by justified by mere recitation of concerns
about “economic balkanization” or a “patchwork” of regulations. Cf. Dep’t
of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (“[T]he Framers’
distrust of economic balkanization was limited by their federalism favoring
a degree of local autonomy”).
Obviously, courts will need to provide guidance in determining when a
state law meets the required standard. In determining whether an area of
regulation is a local or statewide concern, some courts have considered
whether a local law imposes costs or has effects outside the local jurisdiction.
See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151 (Colo. 2003); Webb v.
City of Black Hawk, 295 P.3d 480 (Colo. 2013). The claim that a given local
law has external effects should also be evaluated skeptically, however.
Almost all local regulation can be said to have some broader regional or
statewide effects. The question for the court is whether those effects are
both demonstrable and substantial and thus sufficient to override the local
government’s presumption of authority. Cf. New Orleans Campaign for a
Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002) (Johnson,
J., dissenting) (observing that there was no empirical evidence to support
the state’s conclusion that a variation in the minimum wage would be
detrimental to the state’s interests). An extra-territorial effects test, while
relevant to determining the permissibility of state preemptive law, should be
weighed in favor of local authority.
In weighing state and local regulatory interests, some courts have also
looked to the areas of policy that have traditionally been allocated either
to local or to state authorities. See, e.g., Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove,
470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984). This factor seems misplaced in an era when the
types and range of government activities pursued on both the state and
local levels have expanded considerably. Categories of traditional state
or local competence do not track the relative capacities of local or state
governments, nor their respective interests. A forward-looking presumption
against preemption does not rely on a traditional government functions test.
A better approach is for courts to take a “hard look” at the state’s asserted
interest in relation to a background presumption of local competence.
One such interest may be the state’s concern for protecting vulnerable
populations or vindicating norms of equal treatment. When a state
establishes that statewide regulation is necessary to remedy significant
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discriminatory inequalities, the substantial state interest test will be met.
Cf. Ammons v. Dade City, Fla., 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986) (discriminatory
street paving); Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (housing discrimination).
Where the state is merely overriding local policy preferences in the absence
of a statewide regulatory regime and without attention to the specific
interests advanced by the state override, the standard will not be met. State
laws that deregulate entire swaths of activity will often be overbroad. Cf. Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.870 (barring all local firearms regulation). So, too, state
laws that address particularistic, narrow interests should have difficulty
meeting the substantial interest test, see Fla. Stat. § 500.90 (preventing
the local government from regulating Styrofoam products), unless the state
can show that there are real, tangible, and durable negative effects of local
regulation.

3. THE GENERAL LAW REQUIREMENT.
As a further safeguard of local power, Section C.2 includes language
requiring that express preemption measures may only be imposed by
general law. The use of generality requirements in state constitutions to
suppress the pernicious use of special legislation and “ripper” bills is not
new; the first such requirement appeared in Ohio’s state constitution in
1851, see Ohio Const. of 1851, art. XIII, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall pass
no special act conferring special corporate powers”), and many states
followed suit shortly thereafter. See Charles Chauncey Binney, Restrictions
Upon Local and Special Legislation in the United States, 41 Am. L. Reg. &
Rev. 1109, 1109-13 (1893). The home rule movement of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries eventually supplanted the use of generality
requirements to protect local power from special legislation and “ripper” bills
in most states, but the requirements are still a valuable tool for protecting
home rule governments and local power.
Many current home rule provisions provide state legislatures some way
of regulating local government through general law. See, e.g., Ma. Const.
amend. art. II, § 8 (“The general court shall have the power to act in relation
to cities and towns, but only by general laws which apply alike to all cities, or
to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer than two”);
Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3 (“Municipalities shall have authority to exercise
all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in
conflict with general laws”). While such provisions are likely well-intended,
they raise the difficult task of determining which laws fall under the umbrella
of general law and can be used to preempt local law, and which do not and
therefore cannot be used to preempt local law.
The provision answers this question, in Section C.3, by adopting a version of
the understanding of general law expounded by the Ohio Supreme Court.
See Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 968 (Ohio 2002) (“[T]o constitute a
general law for purposes of home-rule analysis, a statute must (1) be part
of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all
parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3)
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set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to
grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police,
sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon
citizens generally”). Despite the recent growth in preemptive legislation, this
approach to general law has remained a largely effective way of preserving
local power. Relying on this approach, home rule governments have stymied
state efforts to preempt a range of local legislation. See Dayton v. State,
87 N.E.3d 176 (Ohio 2017) (local use of automated traffic-enforcement
systems); Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio 2006) (local ordinances
banning high-capacity magazines for semi-automatic firearms); City of
Cleveland v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (local regulations
restricting the serving of foods containing industrially-produced trans fats
at local food shops).
To be sure, the Canton test is more robust than many states’ general-law
requirements. In application, however, the Canton test does not prohibit
all state regulation of local governments qua local governments, nor
does it require that state law apply equally to local governments and
to citizens generally. The test is instead intended to describe the nature
and characteristics of a state’s police-power enactment that would be
appropriate to override the constitutional delegation of authority to home
rule governments. The specification of the essential characteristics of an
appropriately “general” exercise of the police power—including the concept
that the state cannot solely single out local authority in order for state
legislation to be considered “general”—provides courts with functional
criteria and prevents the state from disabling local authority in the absence
of a legitimate statewide regulatory purpose. It also prevents the targeting
of specific jurisdictions. According to this understanding of general law, the
state bears the burden of showing that the statute in question is a general
law. By imposing a high bar on the state to demonstrate that the statute is
a general law, the provision limits the number of laws that will be immune
to local action and ensures a greater degree of local power over a broader
array of issues.

4. CONCURRENT AUTHORITY AND
REGULATORY STANDARDS.
Drawing on language from the Illinois state constitution, the provision
ensures that concurrent exercises of local power are not deemed to be
in conflict with state law unless the state has clearly declared the state’s
exercise of that power to be exclusive. See Ill. Const. art. VII, § 6(i); City of
Chicago v. Roman, 705 N.E. 2d 81 (Ill. 1998) (upholding a local mandatory
minimum sentencing ordinance that was not provided for in the state’s
criminal code). In other words, if a state initiates a regulatory undertaking,
that state action will not be read to impliedly preempt the field or set a
ceiling for the extent of regulation that is appropriate. States that enact
this provision should expect administrative cost savings from this rule-like
approach.
Furthermore, in cases in which local governments and the state do enjoy
concurrent authority, the provision provides a “one-way ratchet” clause that
treats state standards as regulatory floors and protects the authority of local
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governments to strengthen regulations. See Iowa Code § 364.3(3)(a). This
one-way ratchet is another means of ensuring laboratories of regulatory
experimentation that are responsive to a variety of local interest and
contexts. For example, this latter clause helps local governments promote
interests that are important to them—such as raising minimum wage
requirements, broadening labor benefits, or strengthening environmental
protections—but blocks local governments from acting to weaken state
regulatory standards. See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Grp. v. Cty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.
2d 903 (N.Y. 1987) (permitting more stringent local regulation of chemical
additives than state law); American Fin. Services Ass’n v. City of Cleveland,
858 N.E.2d 776, 792 (Ohio 2006) (Resnick, J., joined by Pfeifer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that local governments may adopt predatory lending laws that are
more stringent than the state’s).

5. ABILITY OF HOME-RULE UNITS TO
ADJUDICATE PREEMPTION.
In order to determine whether a state statute or statutory scheme violates
any of these provisions, it is expected that home-rule units can avail
themselves of a state’s judicial procedure for declaratory judgment actions.
Implicit in this expectation, therefore, is the notion that home-rule units are
not precluded from suing the state for violations of the constitution despite
their being in some sense “creatures of the state.” Cf. Rogers v. Brockette,
588 F.2d 1057, 1068 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting argument that a municipality
lacks standing to sue its state). Moreover, whereas the jurisdiction of federal
courts is limited by the federal Constitution’s relatively stringent “case or
controversy” requirement of Article III, state courts have significantly more
flexibility with respect to their jurisdiction under state constitutions. See
Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La
Différence!, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1273, 1274–75 (2005) (“[S]tate courts
entertain and decide disputes between state or local officials when federal
courts would dismiss comparable cases for lack of ‘standing’ or ‘ripeness’ or
some other shibboleth”). Hence, cases challenging preemption that might
be considered “unripe” in the federal courts might lie comfortably within the
jurisdiction of states’ judicial systems.
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Section D.
Local Democratic Self-Government
1. LOCAL ELECTIONS.
At the heart of the concept of local democratic self-government is the
accountability of local officials to the local community that results from
local popular election of local lawmakers. Local election distinguishes
local self-government from rule by state appointees, or from control by an
electorate outside the locality. Local election is, however, required only for
local legislators. A local government could choose to have appointed judges
or to adopt the council-manager system, with an appointed manager
rather than an elected mayor. But local self-government must ultimately
be rooted in local voter control of the local government. The centrality of
local elections has long been recognized in state constitutions. See, e.g., Fla.
Const., art. VIII, § 2(b) (“[e]ach municipal legislative body shall be elective”);
N.Y. Const., art. IX, § 1(a) (“[e]very local government, except a county wholly
included within a city, shall have a legislative body elective by the people
thereof”). And state courts have likewise recognized this centrality. See, e.g.,
People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 31 (Cal. 1875) (“the very idea of an American city
involves the notion of a local government, of local officers selected by local
inhabitants, and reflecting the wants and wishes of the inhabitants”); State
v. Denny, 21 N.E. 252, 257-58 (Ind. 1882) (under the “principles of local selfgovernment” the people enjoy “the right to select their own local officers”).

2. LOCAL CONTROL OF THE STRUCTURE
ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

AND

A core feature of local self-government under home rule is the ability of
local people to determine the basic features of their government. This
is a purely local matter, having little or no extralocal effect, and it is one
that local people are best suited to determining. This principle has been
recognized in several state constitutions. The strongest is in Colorado, which
provides that a home rule government may supersede within its territorial
limits conflicting state laws concerning “the creation and terms of municipal
officers, agencies, and employments; the definition, regulation, and alteration
of the powers, duties, qualifications and terms or tenure of all municipal
officers, agents and employees”. Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6(a). Other states
give their home rule governments broad power over the structure of their
local governments, subject to general state laws. See, e.g. Hawaii Const.,
art. VIII, § 2 (“Charter provisions with respect to a political subdivision’s
executive, legislative, and administrative structure shall be superior to
statutory provisions, subject to the authority of the legislature to enact
general laws allocating and reallocating powers and functions”); Ill. Const.
art. VII, § 6(f) (“A home rule unit shall have the power subject to approval
by referendum to adopt, alter or repeal a form of government provided
by law … . A home rule municipality shall have the power to provide for its
officers, their manner of selection, and terms of office only as approved
by referendum or authorized by law”); La. Const. art. VI, § 5(E) (“A home
rule charter adopted under this Section shall provide the structure and
organization, powers, and functions of the local government subdivision,
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which may include the exercise of any power and performance of any
function necessary, requisite, or proper for the management of its affairs,
not denied by general law or inconsistent with this constitution”). Accord W.
Va. Stat. § 8-12-2(a)(1) (home rule powers include but are not limited to “the
creation or discontinuance of departments of the city’s government and the
prescription, modification or repeal of their powers and duties”).
This section’s grant of power also includes the “proprietary power,” or the
local government’s power to act as a property owner, employer, market
participant, and contracting party. See, e.g., Proprietors of Mt. Hope
Cemetery v. City of Boston, 33 N.E. 695, 698 (1893) (describing a city-owned
cemetery as falling “within the class of property which the city owns in its
private or proprietary character”); see also Christy Mallory & Brad Sears, An
Evaluation of Local Laws Requiring Government Contractors to Adopt LGBTRelated Workplace Policies, 5 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 478 (2012).
States, of course, have an important role to play in the design of the internal
structure of local governments. State laws may appropriately provide for
model forms of local government; address the size and role of the local
legislative body and other local offices; prescribe local legislative, budgetary,
and administrative procedures; and require local governments to comply
with freedom of information, open meetings, conflict of interest, ethics, and
other basic good government principles. Many local communities are quite
willing for these state laws to apply to their local governments. However,
under this provision and Section D.5 of this Article, home rule governments
should generally be able to vary the rules that determine the structure
and organization of local government in light of local preferences and
circumstances. In a sense, this is just a special application of the provisions
of Section C of this Article, but in which the presumption against preemption
is likely to be especially strong because the decisions concerning local
government structure and organization are particularly unlikely to have
extralocal consequences.

3. LOCAL REGULATION OF LOCAL ELECTIONS.
Election laws both reflect local democratic values and shape the substantive
local policies and decisions in democratic systems. Like the organization
and structure of local government, local elections are of predominant
local concern with little or no effect beyond local borders. Moreover, local
governments have long taken a leadership role in writing the rules for local
elections and, in so doing, expanding the franchise. In the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, some local governments dropped property
ownership requirements for voting before their states did. See generally
Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy
in the United States 19–20 (2000). Again, in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, some municipalities granted women the right to vote
in municipal elections, before the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.
See id. at 186–87. See also State ex rel. Taylor v. French, 117 N.E. 173 (Ohio
1917) (holding that the City of East Cleveland had home rule authority to
give women the vote in municipal elections). In recent years, some local
governments have extended the vote in local elections to people under the
age of 18, to noncitizens, and to nonresidents. See generally Joshua Douglas,
54

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3539617

The Right to Vote Under Local Law, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1039, 1052–67
(2017). See also May v. Town of Mountain Village, 969 P.2d 790, 793–94
(Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (sustaining home rule authority of resort community
to extend the vote to nonresident property owners; “the qualification of
voters in local and municipal elections is a matter of local, not statewide,
concern”). But see Wash. Att’y Gen. Op. 2018 No. 6, 2018 WL 4492838 (local
governments cannot allow people under eighteen to vote in local elections).
A number of state constitutions provide for local control over local elections,
and, similarly, many state courts have recognized local authority to write
local election rules, including some that conflict with state law. See, e.g., Cal.
Const. art XI, § 5(b)(3) (municipal home rule specifically includes the power
to regulate the “conduct of city elections”); Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6(d)
(municipal home rule extends to “all matters pertaining to municipal elections
… including the calling or notice and the date of such election or vote, the
registration of voters, nominations, nomination and election systems, judges
and clerks of election, the forms of ballots, ballots, challenging, canvassing,
certifying the result, securing the purity of elections, [and] guarding against
abuses of the elective franchise”). Some state courts have upheld local
decisions to hold partisan elections when a state mandates non-partisan
ones. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624 (Ariz. 2012); Hoper v.
City & Cty. of Denver, 479 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1971); Johnson v. City of New York,
9 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1937) (permitting the use of a proportional representation
system to elect local legislators); In the Matter of Blaikie v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d
134 (N.Y. 1963 (permitting the adoption of limited voting for the election of
local legislators).
Local power to regulate local elections has also been held to include the
power to adopt local campaign finance laws. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bradley,
841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992) (City of Los Angeles may provide for public funding
of candidates for municipal office notwithstanding state law banning such
public funding systems); McDonald v. New York City Campaign Fin. Bd., 117
A.D.3d 540 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014) (sustaining City’s contribution limits, which
were more restrictive than state law); Nutter v. Dougherty, 938 A.2d 401
(Pa. 2007) (sustaining City ordinance limiting campaign contributions to
candidates for municipal office); State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah
1980) (sustaining local campaign finance disclosure requirement); Elster v.
City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 590 (Wash. 2019) (sustaining City’s voucher public
funding ordinance).
As with the determination of the structure of organization of local
governments, states may also legislate with respect to local elections, and,
again, many local communities may be entirely willing to follow the state
rules. Here, as with local government structure, the purpose of the provision
is to affirm the right of local governments to vary election rules in light
of local preferences and circumstances, and should be protected by the
particularly high burden this Section places on any state action in a setting
that deals particularly with the ability of a local government to speak for its
community.
To be sure, even though local elections are usually a distinctively local
concern, the question of local variation in election law may raise issues
that differ from those posed by local variation in government structure.
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Many state constitutions directly address the right to vote or include equal
protection principles that directly bear on local voting and local elections.
State laws adopted pursuant to these provisions that seek to protect
the vote, particularly with respect to the voting rights of minorities, may
supersede local voting rules that have been found to improperly burden
voting rights or dilute minority votes. See, e.g., Jauregui v. City of Palmdale,
226 Cal. App. 4th 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (California Voting Rights Act’s
vote dilution provision applies to charter city). So, too, local variations may
impose administrative costs for other governments, as when, for example,
municipal elections are administered by county boards of elections and
states could regulate in this situation if the specific action meets the
overriding state interest and narrow tailoring requirements of Section D.5.

4. PROTECTION FROM PUNITIVE PREEMPTION.
In recent years, a number of states have adopted laws that impose harsh
penalties on local officials—civil and sometimes criminal penalties, exposure
to private suits, or removal from office—for implementing or even simply
proposing or endorsing local laws that may be subject to state preemption.
Some states have adopted similar measures making local governments
subject to civil liability for the enactment of local laws that are subject to
preemption. Such punitive preemption laws are completely inconsistent
with the principle of local democratic self-government. Many preemption
laws are vague around the edges; some may violate the state constitution
or legal doctrines. Local officials and home rule governments interested in
advancing local policies or values may want to test the permissible scope
of preemption by calling for or enacting measures that will lead to a judicial
resolution of the issue. Even when the local measure is clearly subject to
preemption, democratic values are still served when a local government
enacts a measure that expresses its particular views on a subject, even if
that will have no legal effect, in order to spark a broader public debate.
Actions that penalize local officials for their views and votes, thus, threaten
to chill both local self-government and democratic discussion within the
state as a whole.
Recognizing the fundamental importance of elected officials being
able to speak and vote freely on behalf of their constituents, the federal
constitution and the constitutions of forty-three states include Speech or
Debate Clauses that immunize legislators from being sued because of their
votes, statements during legislative debate, and other actions connected to
their legislative work. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 1; Steven F. Huefner,
The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 221 (2003). Most states also provide their legislators and
elected executives with similar common law immunities. See id. at 235. The
state constitutional provisions do not protect local legislatures, but several
state supreme courts have extended legislative immunity to local legislators,
either through interpretation of their Speech or Debate Clauses or as a matter
of common law. As the Washington Supreme Court explained, although the
state constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause “on its face applies only to
the State Legislature … the necessity for free and vigorous debate in all
legislative bodies is part of the essence of representative self-government”
and thus extends to city councils. Matter of Recall of Call, 749 P.2d 674, 677
(Wash. 1988). A Tennessee appeals court put the matter particularly well:
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[City councils] make important social and economic
decisions that many times affect our lives to a greater
degree than do decisions made by our state legislators
and congressmen. If the utterances of members of the
legislative bodies such as city councils are not cloaked
with an absolute privilege, an unwarranted consideration—
personal monetary liability—will be interjected into a
councilman’s decisionmaking process. This, we feel,
would have the unavoidable effect of inhibiting the
independent and forceful debate out of which decisions
which best serve the interests of the populace are borne.
Cornett v. Fetzer, 604 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). As the United
States Supreme Court put it in holding that local legislators are absolutely
immune for their legislative activities from liability under the federal
civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “Regardless of the level of government,
the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial
interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability.” Bogan v. ScottHarris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998). See also NPR Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo,
916 F.3d 177, 190-92 (2d Cir. 2019) (discussing scope of local legislative
immunity and applying it to cover mayor’s role in local legislative process).
Local officials may, of course, be legally liable for their misconduct in
appropriate cases. The thrust of this section is simply that local officials
should also enjoy the same immunities for their official acts as are enjoyed
by their state-level counterparts.
Subjecting local governments to liability for the enactment of laws subject
to preemption also chills democratic self-government. In an appropriate
case, preemption would nullify the effect of a local law and any burden it
might create on a private party. Civil liability punishes the local government
for even raising the issue. Local governments, of course, should not be
immune for harmful misconduct. But, traditionally, both states and local
governments have enjoyed some “governmental function” immunity for
their general legislative acts. The scope of this immunity can be uncertain
at the margins, and often involves application of difficult “governmental vs
proprietary” or “discretionary vs ministerial” distinctions. The point, however,
is that as with the liability of local legislative officials, home rule governments
should receive the same type of governmental function liability as the state.

5. HEIGHTENED BURDEN ON THE STATE FOR DISPLACING
THE CORE OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY.
Section D assumes that local people will, through local democratic
institutions, be able to make the decisions about the essential core of local
self-government. That requires local control over local elections and the
structural organization of the local government, local management of local
public facilities and infrastructure, and local decisions over the workforce
that provides local governance.
Many court decisions recognize a local government’s power to adopt or
alter basic features of its governance structure, including occasions when
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the local action is at odds with state law. See, e.g., Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d
48, 54 (Ariz. 1951) (an Arizona charter city has the power to frame its own
laws, including the power to determine “who shall be its governing officers
and how they shall be selected”); Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach, 19 Cal.
Rptr.2d 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (local government may adopt term limits for
local officials); Trader Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro, 93 Cal. App. 4th
37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (city may change the vote necessary for the local
legislature to place a proposed tax increase on the local ballot); Bruce v. City
of Colo. Springs, 252 P.3d 30 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010) (city may adopt a singlesubject rule for local ballot initiatives); Cook-Littman v. Bd. of Selectman
of Town of Fairfield, 184 A.3d 253 (Conn. 2018) (town charter provision
for filling vacancy in town governing board prevails over conflicting state
law); Resnick v. Cty. of Ulster, 44 N.Y.2d 279 (N.Y. 1978) (similar); Baranello
v. Suffolk Cty. Legislature, 985 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1st Dep’t 1987) (similar); Bd. of
Educ. v. Town and Borough of Naugatuck, 843 A.2d 603 (Conn. 2004) (town
may hold separate referenda on education and general town budgets,
notwithstanding state law requiring a single referendum); Windham
Taxpayers Ass’n v. Windham, 662 A.2d 1281 (Conn. 1995) (town charter, not
state legislation, determines criteria for submitting legislation to a town
meeting); Town of Cedar Lake v. Alessia, 985 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. 2013) (town
had authority as a matter of home rule to abolish its parks and recreation
department and board); State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150 (N.M.
1992) (home rule municipality may create a legislative commission larger
than that provided for by state law); Bareham v. City of Rochester, 246 N.Y.
140 (N.Y. 1927) (home rule gives city power to adopt council-manager form
of government); State ex rel. City of Bedford v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga
Cty., 577 N.E.2d 645 (Ohio 1991) (home rule city has power to call advisory
election to consider whether to switch from council-manager system to
mayor-council system).
This principle reflected in this Section D.5 was also clearly articulated in a
handful of state supreme court actions in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century considering and occasionally invalidating as inconsistent with local
self-government state laws that made decisions concerning certain local
services or facilities—the police, municipal waterworks and sewers, local
parks—or transferred control over them to state-controlled agencies. See,
e.g., People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 34 (Cal. 1875) (invalidating state law that
“order[ed] an improvement within the limits of an incorporated city, and
lev[ied] an assessment to pay for it”); State v. Denny, 21 N.E. 252, 258 (Ind.
1882) (invalidating law that placed “exclusive control of all the streets, alleys,
lanes, thoroughfares, bridges, and culverts of the city of Indianapolis” in
three men appointed by the state); State ex rel. White v. Barker, 89 N.W.
204 (Iowa 1902) (invalidating a state law that took from the city of Sioux
City control of its waterworks and vested it in an independently appointed
board of trustees); People ex rel. Bd. Of Park Commr’s of Detroit v. Common
Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 (Mich. 1873) (invalidating state law that took
control of the city’s parks away from the elected local government and
vested it in a state-appointed commission); Rathbone v Wirth, 150 N.Y. 459
(N.Y. 1896) (invalidating state law that deprived Albany common council of
control over the city’s police department).
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These decisions repeatedly recognized the superior authority of the state
legislature but found that state actions taking away local control of key
local facilities and services violated the principle of local self-government,
which these courts determined was an implicit, even if unwritten, tenet of
state governance. Similarly, in response to these so-called “ripper” bills,
many states amended their constitutions to prohibit the legislature from
delegating to “any special commission” “any power to make, supervise or
interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects … or
to perform any municipal functions whatever.” These special commission
bans remain in the constitutions of at least eight states today. Other state
constitutions also protect local control of certain local functions. See, e.g.,
Cal. Const. art. XI, § 5(a) (authorizing charter cities to provide for “the
constitution, regulation, and government of the city police force”). They
also protect local management of the local public workforce. See, e.g., Colo.
Const. art. XX, § 6 (a) (a charter city has “power to legislate upon, provide,
regulate, conduct and control … the definition regulation and alteration
of the powers, duties, qualifications, and terms or tenure of all municipal
officers, agents, and employees.”)
To be clear, local control of the proprietary aspects of local governance
and the municipal workforce is not absolute. Problems with the quality of
local public goods and services, for example, may have significant extralocal consequences in some instances. States may likewise want to require
local governments to meet reasonable, generally applicable environmental,
energy, equity, or labor standards, although costly state mandates should
generally be accompanied by state aid and be subject to the terms of
Section E of this Article. Doctrinally, courts parsing the state constitutional
special commission bans have had difficulty determining what is a “special
commission” and especially what is necessarily a municipal function. So, too,
courts have divided on the state constitutionality of state laws that affect
municipal labor relations. See, e.g., State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
City of Vista, 279 P.3d 1022 (Cal. 2012) (invalidating the application of state
prevailing wage law to municipal contractors); Fraternal Order of Police,
Colo. Lodge #27 v. City & Cty. of Denver, 926 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1996) (holding
that the state cannot impose certain peace officer training and certification
requirements on home rule city’s deputy sheriffs); People ex rel. Seal
Beach Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Seal Beach, 685 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1984)
(sustaining law requiring home rule cities to “meet and confer” with public
employee union); City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Firefighters, Local No.
1489, 639 P.2d 90 (Ore. 1981).
The provision recognizes the legitimacy of state action in this area but
emphasizes the centrality to local self-government of local control over
local public facilities and personnel, as well as the structures of governance.
The state may act with respect to matters encompassed by this Section D
only by establishing an overriding state concern for state action, narrowly
tailored to that concern—a standard that is more exacting than the burden
on the state established more generally for displacing local authority
under Section C.2 of this Article. Overriding state concerns could include
significant public health and safety that extend beyond the affected local
governments; the equity and efficiency benefits of regional service delivery;
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evidence of inadequate local performance; and evidence of significant extralocal effects of a particular local structure or policy. What these concerns
are and what is necessary to establish them will have to develop over time.
But the point of the provision is that the burden is on the state to prove the
need for an intervention that displaces preexisting local control.
Similarly, states also have a role to play in dealing with situations of local
fiscal distress, which may result from the interaction of national economic
conditions, regional socio-economic declines, overly fragmented regional
tax bases, and local (mis)management. The Great Recession of 2007–09
created fiscal crises for many localities, leading to some state intervention
into local governance. Some state actions, such as the appointment of
financial oversight boards, emergency financial managers, or receivers, may
be appropriate, especially when tied to additional state financial support.
But states should be careful to limit the scope of any such interventions,
to limit the role of control boards or emergency managers to fiscal issues,
and to provide for the end of any such intervention after the financial
emergency has been resolved. For a critique of excessive state intervention
and suggestions for appropriate limits, see Michelle Wilde Anderson,
Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experiments in State Takeovers of Local
Governments, 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 577 (2012). For further discussion of
state responsibilities with respect to local fiscal affairs, see Section E.1 and
its commentary.
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Section E.
State Support for Local Democracy
1. ADEQUATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID.
Of all the provisions contained in this Article, this provision is perhaps the
most innovative. No state home-rule provisions make such a guarantee,
and this provision is explicitly not limited to home-rule governments, as
independent fiscal authority is often insufficient to address the spending
needs of all local governments. As Richard Briffault has observed, “without
local wealth adequate to local needs, formal authority is of limited usefulness,
and the structure of local power may prove to be an empty shell.” Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I: The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1990).
The passage of time has only exacerbated the fiscal challenges facing
local governments. Facing dramatic budget shortfalls during the Great
Recession, states made deep cuts in intergovernmental aid. Pew Charitable
Trusts American Cities Project, The Local Squeeze: Falling Revenues and
Growing Demand for Services Challenge Cities, Counties, and School
Districts, 5–8 (2012), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2012/06/
pew_cities_local-squeeze_report.pdf. While such declines are typical
during recessions, this most recent round of state budget cuts was
noticeable not only for the size of the cuts but for their duration. In fact,
some local governments continued to see declines in state support
well into the economic recovery. See, e.g., Pew Charitable Trusts, Brief:
Fiscal Health of Large U.S. Cities Varied Long After Great Recession’s
End 3 (2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2016/04/
FiscalHealthofLargeUSCitiesVariedLongAfterGreatRecessionsEnd.pdf.
As a result, it is important that twenty-first century home rule explicitly
address the role of the state in providing instrastate aid and the state’s
obligation to ensure adequate fiscal capacity for local governments to fund
services that a state chooses to have local governments provide.
This provision is modeled on educational adequacy provisions contained
in many state constitutions. Advocates have had mixed success in suits
seeking to enforce these provisions and even when litigants prove successful
in court, permanent solutions to education funding have proven elusive. See
Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 Stan. L. Rev.
477, 516–22 (2014) (reviewing state constitutional educational adequacy
jurisprudence). Given this precedent, this provision is not designed as
a panacea to disputes about intergovernmental aid. Nevertheless, this
language suggests the importance of the state commitment to the role of
the state in supporting local service delivery.
There are four components to this provision:
Equitable access. Local governments within a state can vary significantly in
their fiscal capacity and the cost of providing government services will vary
across the state. Such differences should be taken into account in assessing
intergovernmental aid formulas.
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Local public services. There is significant variation in what services are
provided by local governments as well as which local governments provide
these services. Typically, general purpose local governments have primary
responsibility for funding first responders, including fire, police, and
ambulance services. Other types of basic services (including water and
sewer maintenance) may be provided by general purpose governments
or special districts. The language of this provision is designed to apply
regardless of which government provides these services.
Adequate intergovernmental support. This provision does not define
adequacy. It assumes that legislatures and—to the extent the issue is
litigated—courts will develop the appropriate criteria. Under this provision,
the state has an obligation, at the least, to collect and disseminate
information about the cost of providing public services at the local level and
about the differing fiscal capacities of jurisdictions.
The intergovernmental aid guaranteed by this provision shall be treated as
a floor for local budgets. This intergovernmental aid will not relieve local
governments of the need to raise own-source revenue, but would ensure
that all state residents have the opportunity for local government to provide
a basic minimum set of services. There is no legally prescribed minimum
set of services. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123
Yale L.J. 1118, 1195–1205 (2014) (offering heuristics to guide stakeholders in
“developing their own locally appropriate priorities and values”).
Anti-coercion. This provision also explicitly addresses recent efforts to
impose dramatic fiscal sanctions on localities for alleged failures to comply
with state policy. The most draconian of these efforts, Arizona’s S.B. 1487,
strips state shared revenue from an Arizona city or town without judicial
oversight when the state’s attorney general decides the local government
is acting in contradiction of state law. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-194.01(B)(1)
(a), 42-5029(L), 43-206(F).
Other states have adopted similar penalty provisions in the context of
specific preemption laws or enacted other types of fiscal sanctions. See,
e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 20-3-10 (2017) (providing for withholding of state
funding for entities found in violation of state’s requirement of cooperation
with federal immigration officials); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 752.053, 752.056
(2017) (providing a penalty of not less $1,000 for an initial violation of state
and law and $25,000 for subsequent violations).
This provision would make such penalties unlawful. Of course, the state
would retain the ability to develop program-specific grants to local
governments, but funding requirements should be related to the purpose of
such programs. This principle reflects the logic of the federal anti-coercion
cases. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012)
(“Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot
be justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions take the form
of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions
are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy
changes.”).
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2. UNFUNDED MANDATES.
States limit local home rule not only by restricting the revenue raising
authority of local governments and providing insufficient intergovernmental
aid. States also restrict local decision-making about spending priorities by
delegating responsibility for state programs to local governments. These
state mandates require local governments to support policy priorities at the
state level with local funds.
Local governments have long decried such unfunded mandates. Reflecting
these traditional concerns, the AMA Model contained its own unfunded
mandate provision, and several states have imposed constitutional restraints
on the state’s ability to control local spending in this manner. See, e.g., Ala.
Const. art. IV, § 111.05; Cal. Const. Art. XIII B; Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18; Me.
Const. art. IX, § 21; Mich. Const. art. IX, § 29; Mo. Const. art. X, § 21; N.H.
Const. pt. 1, Art. 28-a; N.J. Const. Article VIII, § II, para. 5. Other states have
addressed the issue by statute. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 29-1-304.5(1);
30 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 805/1 et seq.; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 29, § 27C;
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354.599; Rev. Code Wash. 43.135.060. The majority of
states, however, offer local governments no such protection.
This model unfunded mandate provision draws from existing provisions,
though critics, including local elected officials, have criticized many of
these provisions as insufficient. Following these criticisms, this provision
does not provide the legislature with the ability to use a super-majority to
override the restriction on unfunded mandates. See, e.g., Me. Const. art. IX, §
21 (allowing unfunded mandated with a two-thirds legislative majority; N.J.
Const. art. VIII, § II, paragraph 4 (allowing unfunded mandates with a threefourths legislative majority).
The exceptions listed attempt to balance the need to protect local decisionmaking with that of providing the state with the ability to respond to
mandates outside its control (though imposed by federal law and litigation)
and the ability to promote the general welfare (by enacting new criminal
statutes or imposing regulations that burden both the public and private
sectors). The application of these exceptions will not always be clear.
For example, local governments in California have challenged the state’s
determination that certain mandates are actually imposed by federal law.
In California, “if federal law gives the state discretion whether to impose a
particular implementing requirement, and the state exercises its discretion
to impose the requirement by virtue of a ‘true choice,’ the requirement is
not federally mandated.” Dep’t of Fin. v. Comm. on State Mandates, 378
P.3d 356, 368 (Cal. 2016). Under this test, the California Supreme Court
found that costs associated with Clean Water Act permitting of municipal
stormwater drains were mandates reimbursable by the state. Id. However,
in providing a list of exceptions, the provision attempts to limit litigation
about implied exceptions. See Durant v. State, 566 N.W.2d 272, 281 (Mich.
1997) (finding no implied exception for federal mandates under Michigan’s
unfunded mandate provision); Los Angeles v. California, 729 P.2d 202, 212
(Cal. 1987) (holding that legislation applicable to both public and private
employees is not a new program or higher level of services, as required to
trigger California’s unfunded mandate provision).
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The model provision allows only local governments to sue under this
provision. In this, the provision departs from other models that explicitly
authorize taxpayer standing. See, e.g., Mo. Const. art. X, § 21. While unfunded
mandates threaten local decision making about spending priorities, allowing
taxpayers to challenge such statutes opens to the doors to legal challenge
in situations where there is no local government opposition to the mandate.
At the same time, the provision reflects the fact that litigation costs may be
a barrier to challenging state mandates. The model language addresses this
concern by creating an agency adjudication system for unfunded mandate
claims, to allow local governments to challenge state laws both more quickly
and more cost-effectively. Both California and Massachusetts have created
such systems. In Massachusetts, the Office of the State Auditor performs
this role. In California, a dedicated agency, the Commission on Mandates,
adjudicates such disputes. Individual states adopting this model can choose
whether to create a new agency for this purpose or assign responsibility
to an existing state agency. Depending on the preferences of the adopting
state, this delegation could be done in the constitution itself or (as the
model language suggests) by the delegation of authority to the legislature.
Agency adjudication would, of course, subject to judicial oversight.
Finally, in keeping with existing unfunded mandate laws, this provision
applies to all local governments and not just those with home rule. Broader
application is important because unfunded mandates have an outsized
impact on non–home rule jurisdictions. For example, school districts, facing
limited funds to meet new state requirements, have brought many of the
lawsuits under current unfunded mandates provisions. Further, jurisdictions
without home rule will lack the fiscal authority provided to home rule
governments under this model.
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“

"Local democracy has always been important,
but the ability of local governments to meet
the needs of their communities in today's
climate is insufficient...The time for a new,
vigorous vision of home rule has arrived."
-Clarence Anthony, CEO & Executive Director,
National League of Cities
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